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Introduction
Florian Wagner-von Papp*
f.wagner-von-papp@ucl.ac.uk
Reader in Law (Associate Professor), University College London (UCL), Faculty of Laws, London
1. Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 1/2003 aims at convergence of the substantive 
competition laws in the Member States of the European Union. To be sure, 
substantial differences between Member States’ laws remain in the areas of unilat-
eral conduct and merger control.1 Yet in the area of anticompetitive agreements, 
convergence has made great strides. National procedure and sanctions, however, 
were largely excluded from the convergence goal of Regulation (EU) 1/2003,2 and 
on the matter of individual sanctions the recitals merely state that “as regards 
natural persons, they may be subject to substantially different types of sanctions 
across the various systems.”3 
*  I would like to thank Wouter Wils and Florence Thépot for helpful comments.
1 For a criticism of the unilateral conduct exception to the convergence rule, see recently D. Hildebrand, Article 3 
(2) in fine: Time for review, May 2015, Concurrences Review No. 2-2015, Art. No. 72323, www.concurrences.
com. 
2 National procedure and sanctions only appear in the periphery. See Art. 5, 12 Regulation (EU) 1/2003. 
3 Recital 16 (in the context of the exchange of information under Art. 12 Regulation (EU) 1/2003).
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ABSTRACT
suite à l’harmonisation des règles matérielles dans le 
cadre du règlement (ce) no. 1/2003, la commission a 
récemment commencé à se pencher sur la question de 
l’harmonisation des règles de procédures et 
de sanctions, alors que le Parlement européen a, en 
janvier 2016, demandé l’introduction de sanctions 
contre les personnes physiques. ce dossier examine 
l’état actuel des sanctions individuelles dans les États 
membres, fait état des difficultés institutionnelles 
posées par ces sanctions individuelles en particulier à 
l’égard des programmes de clémence, et se penche sur 
les avantages et inconvénients de l’introduction de 
sanctions individuelles, en particulier de nature pénale. 
ce dossier examine l’expérience de la France, 
de l’Allemagne, du royaume-uni et des États-unis 
en matière de sanctions pénales et présente des 
données empiriques ayant trait aux attitudes du public 
dans différents États membres et aux États-unis envers 
les infractions au droit de la concurrence.
Following the substantive harmonisation in Regulation 
(EC) no. 1/2003, the Commission has started more 
recently to focus on procedure and sanctions, and in 
January 2016, the European Parliament called for 
penalties against natural persons. This ‘On Topic’ issue 
looks at the current state of individual sanctions on the 
Member State level, examines the institutional 
challenges these individual sanctions present especially 
for leniency programmes, and discusses the pros and 
cons of introducing further individual, in particular 
criminal sanctions. This ‘On Topic’ issue examines the 
experience with criminal sanctions in France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, and 
presents empirical evidence on public attitudes towards 
competition law infringements in various Member 
States and the United States.
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2.  In the course of the review of Regulation 1/2003, 
the European Commission has now turned its atten-
tion to these matters of national procedure and sanc-
tions. In 2013, the then-Director General for Competi-
tion remarked that despite some voluntary convergence 
toward a level playing field, “bumps remain where proce-
dures and sanctions are concerned.”4 Instead of relying 
on soft convergence, the Commission considers intro-
ducing binding EU law,5 dubbed “Regulation 2” by the 
current Vice-President of the German Bundeskartellamt.6 
In May 2014, Vice-President Almunia announced that he 
intended “to set in motion a reflection on how the system 
has functioned so far and its future development” before 
the end of his mandate,7 and in July 2014, the Commis-
sion published its Communication “Ten Years of Anti-
trust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achieve-
ments and Future Perspectives”8 with an accompany-
ing Staff  Working Document.9 One of the focal points 
of this stock-taking exercise was the issue of individual 
sanctions, and in particular the impact of the current 
divergent approaches in the Member States on leniency 
programmes.10 The most recent development in this 
process is the launch of a public consultation that opened 
in November 2015 and closed in February 2016.11
I. Overview
3. This On Topic issue seeks to contribute in two ways to 
the discussion. First, it takes stock of the status quo with 
regard to individual sanctions in the lex lata of some of 
the biggest Member States in the European Union, and 
the associated challenges. Second, it discusses the pros 
and cons of increased individual, in particular criminal, 
sanctions de lege ferenda, and the institutional issues 
that will have to be addressed to fit such individual sanc-
tions into the overall antitrust enforcement scheme in a 
multi-jurisdictional context and make the enforcement of 
individual sanctions effective.
4 A. Italianer, The ECN, convergence and enforcement of EU competition law: 
achievements and challenges (3 October 2013), European Competition Day, 
Vilnius, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2013_08_en.pdf. 
5 Ibid.
6 K. Ost, From Regulation 1 to Regulation 2: National Enforcement of EU 
Cartel Prohibition and the Need for Further Convergence (2014) 5(3) Journal 
of European Competition Law & Policy (JECLAP) 125–36. 
7 J. Almunia, Honing the Instruments of EU Competition Control (15 May 
2014), International Competition Law Forum, St. Gallen, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-378_en.htm.
8 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament 
and Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: 
Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM(2014) 453 final (9 July 2014) 
(the “Commission’s Ten Years Communication”).
9 Commission Staff Working Document, Enhancing competition enforcement 
by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural 
issues, SWD(2014) 231 final (9 July 2014) (“Staff Working Document”). 
10 See the Commission’s Ten Years Communication, n. 8, §§ 41, 42, 46; Staff 
Working Document, n. 9, §§ 89–102.
11 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/
index_en.html
4.  I am delighted that an outstanding panel of experts 
has agreed to contribute to this issue. 
5. M. David Viros, Chief of Staff  and Head of Interna-
tional and European Affairs at the Autorité de la concur-
rence examines criminal enforcement against individuals 
in France and the interface with administrative enforce-
ment. He highlights some of the challenges, in particular 
the interaction between criminal enforcement by public 
prosecutors and leniency programmes administered by 
the Autorité. 
6. Professor Daniel Zimmer of the University of Bonn, 
former Chairman of the German Monopolkommission 
(“Monopolies Commission”), describes the practice of 
individual administrative fines for antitrust infringe-
ments and criminal enforcement against bid rigging 
in Germany, and engages with the debate in Germany 
about the criminalisation of hardcore cartels beyond 
the bid-rigging offence. This debate has recently gained 
momentum in Germany due to the Monopolies Commis-
sion’s recommendations.12 Professor Zimmer argues in 
his contribution that more fact-finding is necessary, but 
that the available evidence indicates that criminalisation 
may well be necessary to achieve sufficient deterrence, 
and that criminalisation should be accompanied by a 
leniency programme for individuals, as well as possibly 
a whistleblower programme with rewards13 or occupa-
tional bans for infringers similar to director disqualifi-
cation orders. 
7.  Professor Bill  Kovacic, Global Professor of Compe-
tition Law at George Washington University, Visiting 
Professor at King’s College London, Non-Execu-
tive Director at the Competition and Markets Author-
ity (CMA) in the UK, and former Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission in the United States, provides 
insights based on the experience in the United States. He 
cautions that it is not enough to change the law in the 
books to include a criminal offence, and draws atten-
tion to the importance of the gradual building of institu-
tions. He outlines the long process it took for US criminal 
enforcement to be where it is today. He points out the 
need to understand the “institutional interdependencies” 
of different features of the antitrust system, and that 
tinkering with one aspect, namely introducing criminal 
sanctions, may have repercussions and unintended conse-
quences in other areas, such as the interpretation of the 
12 Monopolkommission, Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte, XX. 
Hauptgutachten 2012/13 (2014) §§ 118–217, http://monopolkommission.de/ 
images/PDF/HG/HG20/HG_XX_gesamt.pdf with an English summary in 
§§ 18–28 of http://monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/HG/HG20/HG_XX_
Summary.pdf (also see the accompanying press release Monopolkommission, 
Pressemitteilung, 9 July 2014, http://tinyurl.com/h94daez); 
Monopolkommission, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen, 
Sondergutachten 72 (2015), http://monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/
SG/s72_volltext.pdf; see already Monopolkommission, Stärkung des 
Wettbewerbs bei Handel und Dienstleistungen, XIX. Hauptgutachten 2010/11 
(2012) § 479 (calling for research into the question of criminalisation). 
13 On whistleblowing rewards see also A. Stephan, Is the Korean Innovation 
of Individual Informant Rewards a Viable Cartel Detection Tool? (January 
15, 2014), CCP Working Paper 14–3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405933; E. 
Bueren, Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug (2012) Zeitschrift 
für Wettbewerbsrecht 310–48. Ce
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scope of substantive infringements or the evidentiary 
standards applied. He emphasises the need for trans-
parency, both in the political discussion preceding the 
introduction of criminal sanctions and in the applica-
tion of these sanctions. He highlights the importance of 
patient institution building, in particular for cooperation 
between competition authorities and prosecuting author-
ities where they are not one and the same. A further 
important aspect highlighted by Professor Kovacic is the 
building of support for criminalisation in the population 
and judiciary. This last point leads up to the contribution 
by Professor Andreas Stephan. 
8. Professor Andreas Stephan of the Centre for Competi-
tion Policy at the University of East Anglia addresses the 
assumption, made by many in the criminalisation debate, 
that public opinion in Europe does not consider antitrust 
infringements as sufficiently worthy of moral condem-
nation to justify criminal sanctions.14 The question is 
an empirical one, and Professor Stephan has addressed 
it in the way empirical questions should be approached: 
by looking at the evidence. He reports on large-scale 
surveys on public attitudes to antitrust infringements 
in the UK, Germany, Italy, and the US.15 As Professor 
Stephan explains, the results of the survey will not settle 
the debate once and for all: the data are conducive to 
cherry-picking. Proponents of criminalisation can now 
point to evidence that in the UK, the US, in Germany 
a majority of respondents considered price fixing as 
equally serious as fraud, and as equally or more serious 
than insider trading; that an overwhelming majority 
in all jurisdictions considered it more serious than ille-
gally downloading music; and that a strong minority 
of respondents (some 45%) considered cartels at least 
as serious as tax evasion. One can also reject the notion 
that the public attitude to white-collar crime in the US is 
somehow “unique”; Professor Stephan draws attention 
to the surprising uniformity of the responses from the US 
and from the European clusters. Opponents of criminal-
isation will likely argue that when directly asked whether 
imprisonment would be an appropriate sanction for price 
fixers, support in Europe hovers between one quarter and 
one third of respondents. However, Professor Stephan 
explains that there may have been a response bias because 
of uncertainty whether “imprisonment” referred to a 
prison sentence (that could possibly be suspended) or to 
actual incarceration (which could be considered excessive 
in a jurisdiction where most first-time nonviolent offend-
ers only get suspended prison sentences). Indeed, such a 
response bias appears likely, given that otherwise it would 
be difficult to explain how a majority in most of the juris-
dictions can equate the seriousness of price fixing with 
fraud, but reject imprisonment as a possible sanction — 
unless this was understood as a popular vote to decrimi-
nalise fraud. With regard to attitudes in the UK, the new 
survey in combination with an earlier survey conducted in 
14 This is emphasised in particular by opponents of criminalisation. See, e.g., 
Ost, n. 6, 134; M Dreher ‘Wider die Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts’ 
(2011) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 232, 237.
15 The full survey results are reported in A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes 
to Price Fixing in the UK, Germany, Italy and the USA, CCP Working Papers 
15–8, http://tinyurl.com/zlbwnrh.
the UK16 also allows some longitudinal insight: support 
for the sanction of imprisonment appears to have tripled 
in the UK between the first and the second survey. 
II. Status quo
9.  With regard to the status quo, the experience with 
criminal enforcement in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland—often touted as the European jurisdictions with 
criminal enforcement—is limited and fairly well publi-
cised, and I will only briefly mention it below. 
10. In contrast, the state of the “law in action” in conti-
nental European Member States on individual sanc-
tions is much less transparent.17 There are at least four 
reasons for this intransparency regarding individual, 
and in particular criminal enforcement on the continent. 
First, there are language barriers: to the extent there is a 
detailed discussion, the discourse takes mostly place in 
the local language (French, German, Italian, Spanish, 
Polish, etc.). International observers usually rely on 
brief  English-language summaries in multi-jurisdictional 
surveys that may or may not capture accurately the law in 
action.18 Secondly, while the competition law community 
in the UK has predominantly accepted the arguments 
16 A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel 
Enforcement in Britain (May 1, 2007), (2008) 5(1) Company Law Review 
123–45, http://ssrn.com/abstract=993407. 
17 According to the country reports in A. N. Campbell (ed.), Getting the Deal 
Through: Cartel Regulation, 2015, 15th edn, at least the following EU 
jurisdictions provide for criminal sanctions for cartels (or, where noted, only 
bid rigging): Austria (bid rigging, see A. Ablasser-Neuhuber and F. Neumayr, 
ibid., 17, 19); Belgium (B. Lebrun and L. Bersou, ibid, 23, 25: “Bid rigging 
is the sole cartel activity which is likely to lead to criminal sanctions”); the 
Czech Republic (T. Fiala, ibid., 63, 65); Denmark (since 2013; A. Rung-
Hansen, ibid., 69, 71); France (see the contribution by David Viros in this 
issue); Germany (bid rigging; see below, Professor Zimmer’s contribution 
in this issue, and Wagner-von Papp, What if all Bid Riggers Went to Prison 
and Nobody Noticed? Criminal Antitrust Law Enforcement in Germany in 
C. Beaton Wells and A. Ezrachi [eds.], Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies 
of an International Regulatory Movement (Oxford: Hart 2011) 157); Greece 
(see A. Papadopoulos and L. Lovdahl Gormsen, in Campbell, 104, 107); 
Hungary (bid rigging; L. Szabó, ibid., 117, 120); Ireland (P. Andrews and 
D. Collins, ibid, 135, 137–8; for more detail see P. Massey and J. D. Cooke, 
Competition Offences in Ireland: The Regime and Its Results, in Beaton-Wells 
and Ezrachi, 105; T. Calvani and K. M. Carl, The Competition Act 2002, Ten 
Years Later: Lessons from the Irish Experience of Prosecuting Cartels as 
Criminal Offences, [2013] 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 296), ; Italy (R. 
Caiazzo and F. Costantini, in Campbell, 150, 154); Poland (bid rigging only, 
D. Hansberry-Bieguńska and M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, ibid, 212, 214); 
Romania (separate provisions for cartels and bid rigging, M. Rădulescu and V. 
Iacob, ibid, 227, 229); Slovenia (N. Pipan Nahtigal and T. Lahovnik, ibid, 245, 
247–8); UK (for the amended cartel offence, see A. Stephan, The UK Cartel 
Offence: A Purposive Interpretation [2014] 12 Criminal Law Review 879; 
P. Gilbert, Changes to the UK Cartel Offence—Be Careful What You Wish for 
[2015] 6 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 192; for the 2002 
version, see idem, The UK Cartel Offence: Lame Duck or Black Mamba, 
Centre for Competition Policy [CCP] Working Paper No. 08-19, http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1310683; J. Joshua, DOA: Can the UK Cartel Offence be 
Resuscitated, in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, 129). This does not even include 
criminal sanctions for procedural offences, such as in Cyprus. Finland, and 
Sweden (and in the EFTA Switzerland) considered, but eventually rejected 
criminalisation. The Netherlands considered re-criminalising cartels, but 
eventually decided against it (M. J. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: 
Principles and Practice [Oxford: Hart 2014] 222–4). In the EEA, Norway has 
also criminal sanctions (T. Sando and A. J. Hageler, in Campbell, 206, 208). 
To be sure, in many of these jurisdictions the criminal cartel provisions are 
law in the books without enforcement. Yet even this law in the books may 
become relevant when it comes to extradition, see below, § 40. 
18 See the country surveys in Campbell, n. 17. Ce
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for the criminalisation of cartels since the Penrose report 
and the subsequent introduction of the cartel offence in 
2002, enthusiasm for criminal enforcement has gener-
ally been muted on the Continent.19 Even administra-
tive (or quasi-criminal) enforcement against individuals 
is not uncontroversial.20 This lukewarm response also 
has an impact on the interest in research of the status 
quo—competition law experts are generally happy to 
leave criminal enforcement to criminal law experts, and 
criminal law experts rarely tend to devote their atten-
tion to competition matters. Thirdly, the intransparency 
is owed to difficulties in accessing information on the 
sanctions imposed on individuals. Higher privacy stand-
ards on the Continent prohibit naming and shaming in 
the press, and access to criminal or quasi-criminal deci-
sions is restricted. The fourth reason is that in continental 
jurisdictions, criminal enforcement is usually decentral-
ised: it is public prosecutors with local or regional juris-
diction that investigate and prosecute these cases. 
1. Looking at enforcement 
numbers
11.  Let us first look at the enforcement numbers—
bearing in mind that numbers indicate activity, not neces-
sarily effectiveness of enforcement.21
12. David Viros reports that in France there have been 
approximately two criminal convictions per year under 
Article  L.  420-6 of the French Commercial Code over 
the first two decades of the provision’s existence.22 While 
most of these convictions resulted in fines or suspended 
prison sentences, at least five defendants were actually 
incarcerated for periods up to one year, starting as early 
as 1995.23 To put this into perspective: this actual incar-
ceration took place more than a decade earlier than the 
suspended prison sentence in the 2006 heating oil cartel 
19 See Ost, n. 6, 133–4; P. Klocker and K. Ost, Nach der Novelle ist vor der 
Novelle—Themen einer 8. GWB-Novelle, in Brinker (ed.), Recht und 
Wettbewerb, Festschrift Bechtold (Munich: CH Beck 2006) 229, 240–2; 
Dreher, n. 14; A. Bräunig Wider die Strafbarkeit von “Hardcore Kartellen” 
de lege ferenda, (2011) HRRS 425, https://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/
archiv/11-10/index.php?sz=11. These repeat and build on the objections 
that had been raised by competition lawyers in earlier times, when it was 
mainly criminal lawyers that argued for criminalisation. See, e.g., W. Kartte 
and A. von Portatius, Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts? (1975) Betriebs-
Berater 1169–72; W. Möschel, Zur Problematik einer Kriminalisierung von 
Submissionsabsprachen (Cologne: Carl Heymanns 1980).
20 Ost, n. 6, 134; Klocker and Ost, n. 19, 244 (suggesting that it may be 
preferable to abolish individual liability and apply administrative procedure 
to fines imposed on the undertaking, similar to the procedure in the EU 
Courts; such a procedure would, however, arguably not be consistent with the 
guarantees in the German Constitution).
21 See W. E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good 
Performance, 16 George Mason Law Review 903; idem and D. A. Hyman, 
Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize? (December 
19, 2015), forthcoming in Washington Law Review, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2705919. 
22 See David Viros’s contribution below, §§ 13, 14. See also L. Idot, 
Conference—Criminal and competition laws: Comparative study of antitrust 
criminal provisions and policies in European Member States, February 2008, 
Concurrences Review No. 1-2008, Art. No. 15196, www.concurrences.com.
23 D. Viros, below, §§ 13, 14. The convictions concerned multiple (antitrust and 
other) offences, ibid, § 12.
in Ireland, which is widely touted as the “first successful 
criminal prosecution of a hard core cartel in the EU,”24 and 
“the first prison sentence in Europe.”25 
13. In Germany (as in a number of other Member 
States26), “only” bid rigging is a criminal offence (§ 298 
of the German Criminal Code).27 Other cartel infringe-
ments, including price fixing, market allocation, or 
output restrictions, are mere administrative offences 
that may result in administrative fines both for indi-
viduals and undertakings. Even with this limited scope 
of the criminal offence, there were 264  prosecutions, 
184 convictions, and 26 suspended prison sentences in the 
period from 1998 to 2008 (inclusive).28 In his contribu-
tion to this issue, Professor Zimmer updates these statis-
tics through to 2012 by adding that in 2009, 19 convic-
tions were reported (three of which were suspended 
prison sentences, one for six months, one for more than 
9 but no more than 12 months, and one for more than 
one year but no more than two years); in 2010, 17 convic-
tions were reported (one of which was a suspended prison 
sentence of more than one but no more than two years); 
in 2011, 20  convictions were reported (seven of which 
were suspended prison sentences, four of which were for 
sentences of more than one but no more than two years); 
and in 2012, 22  convictions were reported (all fines).29 
In addition, in 2013, the latest year for which officially 
reported data are available, 35 convictions were reported, 
of which five defendants were sentenced to suspended 
prison sentences.30 
In Germany, the highest actual prison 
sentence to be served being two years and 
10 months
14.  Altogether, this brings the number of criminal 
convictions in Germany reported in the official statistics 
for bid rigging between 1998 to 2013 (inclusive) to 297 
24 P. K. Gorecki and D. McFadden, Criminal Cartels in Ireland: the Heating Oil 
case (2006) European Competition Law Review 631, 640.
25 B. A; Barnett, Criminalization of Cartel Conduct—The Changing 
Landscape, Adelaide, Australia (3 April 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
criminalization-cartel-conduct-changing-landscape. The Irish Competition 
and Consumer Protection Commission’s website makes the much more 
modest claim that these were the first jury convictions for price fixing in 
Europe, which is probably accurate given the nearly complete absence of 
juries in continental Europe. 
26 E.g., Austria, Hungary, Poland, and apparently Belgium; references in n. 17. 
As David Viros points out in his contribution, the restrictive conditions of the 
more general provision Article L. 420-6 will de facto mostly be fulfilled in 
bid-rigging cases. 
27 See D. Zimmer’s contribution below, § 1; F. Wagner-von Papp, What if 
all Bid Riggers Went to Prison and Nobody Noticed? Criminal Antitrust 
Law Enforcement in Germany, in C Beaton-Wells and A Ezrachi (eds.), 
Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011) 157, 164–82.
28 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 166–8 (explaining that these statistics are 
underreporting actual enforcement), 182 (statistics on prosecutions, 
convictions and sentences between 1998 and 2008, inclusive).
29 See the contribution by Daniel Zimmer, § 5, and the statistics from 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3 for the respective years.
30 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3, 2013 (Wiesbaden 2015) 172. 
Two of the suspended prison sentences were to six-month prison each, and 
three were for periods of between 9 and 12 months. Ce
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convictions, with 42 suspended prison sentences and the 
remainder criminal fines. I have pointed out elsewhere 
that these cases reported in the official statistics system-
atically under-report the more serious cases.31 Because of 
this bias, the official statistics so far do not report any 
actual cases of incarceration, so that one has to rely on 
anecdotal evidence. In 2005 and 2006, two persons were 
actually incarcerated, the highest actual prison sentence 
to be served being two years and 10 months.32 In 2015, 
the German Federal Court of Justice dismissed an appeal 
of two defendants who had been convicted of bid rigging 
(concurrently with corruption charges) and sentenced to 
one-and-a-half  years and two years and four months, 
respectively.33 At least the latter prison sentence cannot 
be suspended.34 Whether these three cases are the only 
ones in which defendants “served time” or whether they 
are the tip of the iceberg is impossible to say.35
In the beer breweries cartel, 14 individuals 
were fined a total of approximately 
€3.6 million
15. In addition to criminal enforcement for bid rigging, 
German competition authorities have prosecutorial 
discretion to impose administrative fines on individu-
als under § 81 of the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition. For individuals, the statutory maximum 
fine is €1  million. Again it is difficult to get at reliable 
statistics about the actual practice of setting the fine: 
the Bundeskartellamt, curiously, chooses not to report 
systematically the amount of the individual fines 
imposed. Nevertheless, it is possible to give some indica-
tion of the “law in action.” In a case before the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundeskartellamt 
submitted that in the period from 1993 to 2010 it had 
fined 510 individuals and 563 legal persons for compe-
tition law infringements—approximately one individ-
ual per legal person.36 The average fine per fined individ-
ual in that period was reported to be €56,000.37 It should 
be noted that this average includes not only horizontal 
31 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 166–7.
32 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 168–70. The 2005 conviction was mostly for 
corruption offences and only partly for aiding and abetting bid rigging 
(sentence of two years and six months; BGH, 22 June 2004, 4 StR 428/03, 
49 BGHSt 201), but the 2006 conviction and sentencing to two years and ten 
months in the District Heating Pipes cartel was for bid rigging (under the 
bid-rigging offence and concurrently aggravated fraud; LG Munich II, 3 May 
2006, W5 KLs 567 Js 30966/04, BeckRS 2008, 00736).
33 BGH, 29 April 2015, 1 StR 235/14, BeckRS 2015, 12466. 
34 Sentences of more than two years cannot be suspended. § 56(2) of the 
German Criminal Code (StGB).
35 Ost, n. 6, reports that “at a recent meeting of public prosecutors (…) with 
a special competence for prosecuting bid-rigging, not one of them could 
remember any conviction including the imposition of a custodial sanction.” 
With respect, given that they overlooked the three cases in which I know there 
to have been custodial sentences (excluding all the suspended sentences), this 
seems to speak more to the level of intransparency in German law than to 
the existence or non-existence of further cases. An error-detection mechanism 
that detects zero out of three known errors does not give great confidence in 
its reliability.
36  BVerfG, 19 December 2012, 1 BvL 18/11, WuW/E DE-R 3766, §§ 52, 
60 – Verzinsungspflicht, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
ls20121219_1bvl001811.html (in German).
37 Ibid., § 60.
cartel cases, and that the maximum fine was doubled 
from €500,000 to €1 million in 2005 without retrospective 
effect, so that most of the fines in the sample will have 
been based on the lower maximum. There are some indi-
cations that in larger cartel cases, typical individual fines 
are in the order of magnitude of €200,000 to €250,000. 
For example, in the beer breweries cartel, 14 individuals 
were fined a total of approximately €3.6 million.38 Even if  
this amount were uniformly distributed among all these 
14  individuals, the fine for each of these 14  individuals 
would be approximately €257,000. Since a skewed distri-
bution seems more probable, the highest fine is likely to 
have been higher—possibly substantially higher—than 
that. Similarly, individual fines of €250,000 and €200,000 
were reported in the Wholesale Paper39 and Cement40 
cases, respectively. However, the quantification of the fine 
depends on multiple factors, among others the wealth 
and income of the person fined.41 Accordingly, individ-
ual fines even in cartel cases can be substantially lower 
than the previous numbers suggest.42
16. It should be pointed out that in Germany these indi-
vidual administrative fine appear to be magnitudes higher 
than the usual individual criminal fines that are imposed 
in the officially reported bid-rigging cases.43 However, this 
may be due to the under-inclusivity of the official statis-
tics that arguably exclude the more serious bid-rigging 
cases; in the District Heating Pipes cartel, in addition to 
the 2-year-10-month prison sentence described above, the 
court imposed criminal a fine of €100,000 on the main 
defendant.
17. France and Germany are not alone among the conti-
nental jurisdictions in imposing prison sentences. In 
Austria, for example, courts have imposed not only 
suspended sentences,44 but also prison sentences that 
were not (entirely) suspended.45
38  Bundeskartellamt, 2 April 2014, Fallbericht Bußgelder gegen Brauereien 
(Summary Case Report on the decisions of 27 December 2013 and 31 March 
2014, Case B10-105/11), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/ 
Entscheidung/DE/Fallberichte/Kartel lverbot/2014/B10-105-11.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
39 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792, WuW/E DE-R 2225, 
§ 10 — Papiergroßhandel (Wholesale Paper). 
40 In the Cement case, the individual fine of €200,000 imposed on the individual 
“Ed. Sch.” was reduced by 5 per cent (€10,000) on appeal because of the 
long duration of the appeal procedure, BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, 
WuW/E DE-R 3861, §§ 1, 87–91 — Grauzement (Cement).
41 Second sentence of § 17(3) of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
42 E.g., in the Cement case, the lowest of the fines for nine individual appellants 
was only €6,000, BGH, n. 40. In another cartel case, the Higher Regional 
Court Düsseldorf set a fine of some €40,000 for one of the individuals, OLG 
Düsseldorf, 29 May 2015, V-2 Kart 1+2/13 (OWi), NRWEntscheidungen. For 
a discussion of the factors influencing the setting of the individual fines in 
an information exchange case, see OLG Düsseldorf, 29 October 2012, V-1 
Kart 1–6/12 (OWi) §§ 140–96, NRWEntscheidungen — Silostellgebühren.
43 See Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 168 in fn. 75.
44 E.g., OGH, 26 January 2001, 13 Os 34/01, http://tinyurl.com/h5czaj4. 
45 OGH, 6 October 2004, 13 Os 135/03, http://tinyurl.com/jypmnvs (where one 
defendant, D. I. Dietrich B., was sentenced to a prison sentence of two years, 
of which 18 months were suspended, resulting in a six-month incarceration). Ce
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18. The French and German experience should be consid-
ered against the backdrop of the enforcement numbers 
for the cartel offence in the United Kingdom. A lot of 
effort went into the drafting of the original cartel offence 
in s. 188 Enterprise Act 2002, and approximately six to 
ten prosecutions per year had been expected to result.46 
Actual enforcement famously lagged behind expec-
tations. There were, first, the three guilty pleas in the 
Marine Hose cartel, facilitated by the Damocles sword 
of the US plea bargain, that eventually resulted in prison 
sentences of 20, 24 and 30 months.47 Then there was the 
Fuel Surcharges cartel prosecution that failed on the first 
day of trial for procedural reasons.48 More recently, one 
person pleaded guilty in the Galvanised Steel Tank cartel 
case and was sentenced to a suspended sentence of six 
months’ imprisonment,49 while two defendants who did 
not plead guilty and went to trial were acquitted, because 
the jury did not find that they acted “dishonestly.”50 In the 
meantime, the Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act  2013 
(“ERRA 2013”) has removed the dishonesty requirement 
(and replaced it with a range of defences, in particular 
previous publication or notification to the CMA51), so 
that this acquittal need not be indicative for the success 
of future prosecutions. In Ireland, there have been many 
more criminal convictions than in the UK, though not as 
many as in Germany. However, the vast majority ended 
in relatively low fines and a few suspended sentences.52
2. Institutions
19. So, in terms of mere numbers Germany and France 
have more criminal enforcement than the UK and 
Ireland. However, effective deterrence is not a function 
of enforcement numbers as such. Numbers must not 
obscure that current criminal competition law enforce-
ment in Germany and France is not always institution-
ally well embedded in the overall antitrust system, and 
fails to achieve its deterrent potential. 
46 A. Hammond and R. Penrose, Proposed criminalisation of cartels in the UK 
(November 2001), Report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (OFT365)
47 R v. Whittle, Allison and Brammar [2015] EWCA Crim 2560, [2009] 
UKCLR 247.
48 Office of Fair Trading, Project Condor Board Review, http://tinyurl.com/
hdug9am.
49 Competition and Markets Authority, Director Sentenced to Six Months 
for Criminal Cartel, Press Release 14 September 2015, https://www.gov.
uk/government/news/director-sentenced-to-6-months-for-criminal-cartel. 
In sentencing, the judge indicated that a two-year sentence would generally 
be an appropriate sanction, but that this was to be reduced because of the 
substantial cooperation of the defendant. 
50 Competition and Markets Authority, CMA statement 
following completion of criminal cartel prosecution, Press 
Release 24 June 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
cma-statement-following-completion-of-criminal-cartel-prosecution.
51 These new defences present their own problems; see A Stephan, Purposive 
Interpretation, n. 17; Gilbert, n. 17.
52 See the references for Ireland in n. 17, and the information on the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission’s website, http://ccpc.
ie/enforcement-mergers-enforcement-mergers-criminal-enforcement-cartels/
criminal-court-cases.
20. To be sure, both France and Germany have made an 
attempt to integrate criminal enforcement with competi-
tion law enforcement. The Autorité can refer cases to the 
public prosecutor;53 so can the Bundeskartellamt (and the 
competition authorities in the German Länder). French 
courts can ask for the Autorité’s opinion.54 German law 
has made sure that the competition authorities retain 
their jurisdiction for dealing with the undertakings even 
where individuals are criminally prosecuted by public 
prosecutors,55 and that public prosecutors and compe-
tition authorities keep each other informed about their 
investigations under § 298 StGB.56 
21.  Three main failures can, however, be identified in 
both Germany and France: decentralised enforcement 
by general prosecutors and criminal courts; the failure 
to make the most of cooperation between competition 
authorities and prosecutors or courts; and the failure to 
provide for automatic immunity for successful leniency 
applicants. Tax law is generally more effective on all three 
counts. 
Criminal enforcement is largely confined to 
local or regional prosecutors and courts
22. First, in France and Germany (and many other conti-
nental jurisdictions), criminal enforcement is largely 
confined to local or regional prosecutors and courts. 
David  Viros notes that this decentralised enforcement 
differs from the treatment of “serious tax or securi-
ties fraud which is prosecuted by a national, special-
ized public prosecutor.”57 In Germany, the call for such 
a national specialised public prosecutor for serious 
economic crimes has been raised for decades. Economic 
crime is sometimes concentrated in the so-called 
Schwerpunktstaatsanwalt schaften, but these are still rela-
tively decentralised and arguably do not often deal with 
competition law. This  decentralised enforcement by 
general public prosecutors results in a lack of compe-
tition-law specific knowledge and experience, as well as 
in a lack of publicity: while the Bundeskartellamt press 
releases are invariably picked up by the national press, 
reports of criminal enforcement is often confined to 
local court reporting (if  there is any coverage at all). For 
the rest of the world—including potential infringers, 
whose deterrence is after all the whole point of criminal 
enforcement—the level of enforcement and sanctions in 
these jurisdictions remains obscure. Because of the rela-
tively low numbers of criminal competition law cases for 
each of the decentralised enforcers, the decentralisation 
arguably also leads to a distortion in the prioritisation of 
prosecutions. On the one hand, a local prosecutor who 
53 Contribution by David Viros below, §§ 23, 24.
54 Ibid., §§ 21–22. See also ibid. §§ 15–20 for other interactions of administrative 
and criminal enforcement in France.
55 § 82 GWB.
56 RiStBV No. 242, which seems to be honoured more in the breach than in the 
observance. The Bundeskartellamt has invited prosecutors for an exchange of 
experiences since 2012 (see Bundeskartellamt, Press Releases of 10 February 
2012, 15 April 2013, and 3 June 2014).
57 Contribution by David Viros below, § 12. Ce
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gets a small bid-rigging case that is easily provable may 
prosecute where a centralised prosecutor might prioritise 
a more harmful infringement even if  it is slightly more 
difficult to prove. On the other hand, a general prose-
cutor may understandably prioritise cases with more 
salient harm, such as a confidence trickster that defrauds 
a few individuals, over cartel cases where the aggregate 
harm may be magnitudes greater but the victims are less 
readily identifiable. A specialised prosecuting authority 
has an incentive to prove its worth by bringing cases, and 
bringing the right cases. Similarly, it should be consid-
ered whether court jurisdiction could be concentrated 
with courts with competition law experience.
There has up to now been very little 
involvement of the competition authorities 
in the actual prosecution
23.  Second, the jurisdiction of general public prosecu-
tors would perhaps be much less problematic if  competi-
tion authorities were actively involved with the criminal 
proceedings, provided subject-matter expertise, and 
publicised statistical information. Despite some level of 
involvement of the competition authorities with criminal 
cases,58 there has up to now been very little involvement 
of the competition authorities in the actual prosecution 
in France or Germany. Again it is tax law that shows that 
things can be different. In Germany, the tax authorities 
have concurrent jurisdiction with the public prosecutor 
for investigating criminal tax avoidance.59 Even where 
it is the prosecutor that investigates and prosecutes, the 
tax authorities have extensive information and participa-
tion rights.60 The German literature has long asked for a 
similar degree of involvement for competition authorities 
in criminal competition cases.61 
Great care has to be taken that these 
individual sanctions do not interfere with 
the effectiveness of leniency programmes
24. Third, and most pressingly, the protection of leniency 
programmes is paramount for the effectiveness of 
public competition law enforcement. There are excel-
lent reasons, both moral and utilitarian, for increasing 
the emphasis on individual and criminal sanctions. Great 
care has to be taken, however, that these individual sanc-
tions do not interfere with the effectiveness of leniency 
programmes. Where individuals fear they might go to 
58 Above § 20 (note in particular the possibility in France since 2014 for the 
judge to involve the Autorité).
59 §§ 386, 399 Federal Tax Code (Abgabenordnung [AO]). 
60 §§ 402, 403, 406, 407 AO. 
61 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 175, with further references to, inter alia, J. Biermann, 
Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts 
(2007) Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht 1, 43; B. Federmann, Kriminalstrafen 
im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006) 518–20. See also R. Raum, 
§ 82a, in H.-J. Bunte (ed.) Langen/Bunte Kartellrecht Kommentar Vol. 1 12th 
edn (Wolters Kluwer 2014) § 3 (noting that § 82a GWB, which allows the 
court in the administrative fines procedures to permit the competition authority 
to direct questions to the accused, witnesses and expert witnesses, falls short 
of § 407 AO, and is, at any rate, inapplicable to criminal prosecutions; 
considering this to be a legislative mistake that should be corrected). 
prison (even if  in reality the probability for a cooperat-
ing defendant to go to prison in Europe currently tends 
toward zero), and perhaps even if  they fear high pecu-
niary individual sanctions, they may be deterred from 
self-reporting their conduct. It is important, therefore, 
that there is automatic immunity at least for the success-
ful immunity applicant. The importance of guarantee-
ing automatic immunity from criminal prosecution has 
been demonstrated by the much greater effectiveness of 
the 1993 immunity programme in the US compared to 
the previous programme that had offered discretionary 
rebates. 
25.  Unfortunately, neither France nor Germany have 
provided for automatic immunity for successful leniency 
applicants in their criminal competition provisions. 
Viros discusses this issue for France, and notes that the 
Autorité will not refer cases to the public prosecutor 
where a leniency application has been made. This does 
not, however, prevent the public prosecutor from initiat-
ing an investigation on its own accord. The proposal to 
introduce an individual leniency programme providing 
for immunity has not yet been accepted. 
26.  In Germany, the bid-rigging provision provides for 
immunity only where the perpetrator prevents the bid 
from being accepted or has at least expended best efforts 
to prevent acceptance where the bid is not accepted for 
other reasons (§ 298[3] StGB). The general leniency provi-
sion for helping to uncover a crime (§ 46b StGB) does not 
apply to crimes without minimum prison sentences, and 
so does not apply to the bid-rigging provision; even if  it 
did apply, it would only result in a discretionary reduc-
tion of the sentence. In the legislative discussion of § 46b 
StGB, however, the government explained that where the 
accused was guilty of a crime without a minimum prison 
sentence, the prosecutor or court were likely to close the 
case against a perpetrator that contributed substantially 
to the uncovering of the crime anyway. This is arguably 
true in practice: especially given the aversion prose-
cutors and courts have against dealing with complex 
economic crime, it seems very unlikely indeed that a 
successful leniency applicant would ever be prosecuted 
and convicted. However, what counts for the decision to 
reveal a cartel, especially where risk-averse decision-mak-
ers are concerned, is not what actually happens, but the 
expectation of what might happen. In the absence of an 
automatic immunity provision, the possibility of criminal 
prosecution may deter individuals from applying for 
leniency or contributing to their undertaking’s leniency 
application.
27. Yet again, it is tax law that shows that there are no 
conceptual obstacles to providing for automatic criminal 
immunity for perpetrators that self-report.62 
28.  The recommendations for more effective criminal 
competition law enforcement, then, would be to estab-
lish a dedicated, centralised prosecutor; that the compe-
tition authorities should be involved in the investigation 
62 § 371 AO. Ce
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and prosecution with full participation rights; that results 
should be widely publicised (for privacy reasons: usually 
on an anonymised basis); and that there should be an 
automatic immunity provision. 
29. On these dimensions, the UK has mostly done better 
than France or Germany. The CMA and SFO have 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute, results are widely 
publicised, and the no-action letter provides sufficient 
ex ante certainty. The failed Fuel Surcharges prosecu-
tion demonstrated that perhaps a close involvement of 
a public prosecutor with expertise on the criminal proce-
dure element of the prosecution may still be desirable. 
In  the US, the Department of Justice’s subject-matter 
expertise and prosecution experience provides for the 
optimal combination, but one that is arguably not realis-
tically duplicable in Europe in the short or medium term.
30. It is perhaps not a coincidence that tax law provides 
the template for effective criminal enforcement without 
impairing the regulatory objectives: here, the state has 
“skin in the game.” Honi soit qui mal y pense. 
III. Cartel 
criminalisation
31. The arguments for criminal competition law enforce-
ment beyond the confines of the German bid-rigging 
offence or the narrow conditions of the French provi-
sion in Article L. 420-6 of the French Commercial Code 
have been discussed for several decades now, and have 
been systematically introduced into the European debate 
by Professor Wouter Wils.63 First, deterrence by relying 
exclusively on fining undertakings will not be effective, 
not only because these fines cannot be raised to optimal 
levels due to legal and practical (insolvency) constraints, 
but also because fines against the principal will not neces-
sarily deter the agent.64 Second, where there is auto-
matic immunity for leniency applicants, criminal sanc-
tions provide a strong incentive to be first in reporting 
63 W. P. J. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) §§ 544–634; see already W. P. J. Wils, Does 
the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require not only Fines on 
Undertakings, but also Individual Penalties, and in particular Imprisonment?, 
in C. D. Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2003) 411–52. Of course similar arguments had been made 
previously in national discourses, usually with a less economic and more 
legal approach (in Germany, see, e.g., K. Tiedemann, Kartellrechtsverstöße 
und Strafrecht [Cologne: Carl Heymanns 1976]; idem, Welche 
strafrechtlichen Mittel empfehlen sich für eine wirksamere Bekämpfung der 
Wirtschaftskriminalität, in Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages 
[ed.], Verhandlungen des neunundvierzigsten Deutschen Juristentages 
Vol. 1 Part C [Munich: C. H. Beck 1972]; see also, though arguing against 
criminalisation, W. Möschel, Zur Problematik einer Kriminalisierung von 
Submissionsabsprachen [Cologne: Carl Heymanns 1980] with further 
references) and in particular in the US (e.g., G. J. Werden and M. J. Simon, 
Why Price-Fixers Should Go to Prison, [1987] 32 Antitrust Bulletin 917). 
However, Wils’s contributions have undoubtedly had the effect of focusing 
the pan-European discussion on the issue.
64 Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 547–59.
the cartel.65 Third, criminal enforcement is a uniquely 
effective deterrent and sends a strong moral message.66 
Professor Zimmer, in his contribution below, expands on 
these arguments, as did the Monopolies Commission in 
its recent reports.67
32.  Opponents of criminalisation raise objections that 
fall into two broad categories. First, they doubt that 
competition law infringements are sufficiently “immoral” 
to justify criminal enforcement (the moral argument). 
Second, they fear that criminal enforcement could 
endanger the effectiveness of the existing enforcement 
mechanisms (the utilitarian argument). 
Are competition law infringements 
sufficiently “immoral” to justify criminal 
enforcement?
33.  With regard to the moral argument, opponents of 
criminalisation generally acknowledge the large social 
harm that cartels cause, but argue that part of the 
decision to criminalise behaviour should be whether 
there is a sufficient recognition in the population that the 
conduct in question deserves the level of moral oppro-
brium required to employ criminal law, the remedy of last 
resort.68 They postulate that popular opinion would not 
support criminalisation.69
34.  This argument rests on two fragile pillars: that 
popular recognition of conduct as criminal is a neces-
sary condition for criminalising the conduct, and that 
popular opinion would not support criminalisation. 
The argument breaks down if  one of the pillars falls. 
35.  Regarding the first pillar, if  one were to reduce 
criminal law to those prohibitions on which lay persons 
spontaneously agree in a state of nature, that is, without 
the guiding posts of what others consider worthy of 
criminal sanctions, one would end up with a very short 
list. In many cases, it takes the legislator to take the first 
step by criminalising conduct to send a signal that certain 
conduct is considered worthy of condemnation.70
36. Regarding the second pillar, I have to admit that my 
intuition also used to be that popular opinion still does not 
sufficiently recognise the social harmfulness of cartels.71 
The study on which Professor Stephan reports in this 
issue is informative in this regard in two ways. First, even 
65 Wils, Efficiency and Justice,  n. 63, §§ 560–5.
66 Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 566–74.
67 Above n. 12.
68 M. Dreher Wider die Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts (2011) Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 232, 237.
69 Ibid.
70 Baumann and Arzt, Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht (1970) 134 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 24, 30, 32; 
Wagner-von Papp, Kriminalisierung von Kartellen (2010) Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 268, 274 (with reference to the first survey in the UK, see n. 16); 
see also M. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust (2006) Columbia Business Law 
Review 443, 489 et seq; Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 572–4.
71 Wagner-von Papp, n. 70, 274. Ce
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lay people seem to consider price fixing as akin to fraud. 
Second, about two thirds of the European respondents to 
the survey expect that when they buy a product or service, 
the price has been set independently.72 This is important 
both in terms of morality and with regard to positive 
law. With regard to morality, it supports the argument 
that price fixing violates the norm against deception.73 
With regard to positive law, the reason why price fixing 
has not been qualified as fraud in Germany, or a conspir-
acy to defraud in the UK, is that courts found that in 
the past there was no tacit implied promise that prices 
are formed independently.74 Tacit assumptions today are 
different from times in which prices in Europe were often 
subject to price control. Although it would not be desir-
able to apply the general fraud provisions to competition 
cases—because the general criminal law institutions for 
these provisions are not tailored to the requirements of 
competition law—, the very thin doctrinal line between 
fraud provisions and price fixing (and other hardcore 
horizontal cartels) should amply demonstrate that from 
a moral perspective there is hardly any difference, if  any 
at all.75 
37.  David  Viros rightly emphasises that criminal sanc-
tions for antitrust infringements are nothing new in 
Europe, either. He points to Article 419 of the Napole-
onic Criminal Code of 1810. Similarly, in Germany one 
could point to the Prussian royal decree of 14 July 1797,76 
Article 335 of the Bavarian Criminal Code of 1813, and 
§  270 of the Prussian Criminal Code of 1851, all of 
which concerned bid rigging, and were comparable to 
Article 412 of the Napoleonic Criminal Code of 1810.77 
It does not appear that these early provisions were vigor-
ously enforced, but they may indicate that the immorality 
72 Stephan, n. 1, 9.
73 On this point see P. Whelan, Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of 
“Moral Wrongfulness” (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 535, 550–5.
74 For the argument under German law that a positive statement (possibly in 
standard terms) that there was no price fixing could constitute fraud (§ 263 
StGB), and that one could even consider fraud charges when the “contracting 
parties take it for granted that neither of them infringes the Act against 
Restraints of Competition,” see Baumann and Arzt, n. 70, 35; for essentially 
the same argument in the UK for the common law offence of conspiracy to 
defraud, see J. Lever and J. Pike, Cartel Agreements, Criminal Conspiracy 
and the Statutory “Cartel Offence” (2005) European Competition Law 
Review 90, 95, and the discussion in Ian Norris v. Government of the United 
States & Ors [2008] UKHL 16 [59]–[62] (holding that at least in the 1990s 
there was no sufficient consensus that secret price fixing in itself would be 
enough to find conspiracy to defraud, because there was no implied promise 
that the price was reached independently, but making a possible exception 
where “aggravating features” were present, arguably referring to additional 
dishonesty such as “lying to potential purchasers about the existence of the 
agreement,” ibid. [51]). 
75 For a more elaborate justification of the legitimacy of criminalisation, see 
A. Stephan, Four Key Challenges to the Successful Criminalization of Cartel 
Law, (2014) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 333, 336–44.
76 Decree of 14 July 1797 against various abuses in judicial and other public 
subhastations and auctions, reprinted in Carl Ludwig Heinrich Rabe (ed.), 
Sammlung Preußischer Gesetze und Verordnungen, Vol. IV (Halle and 
Berlin 1817), 204. 
77 See Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 160–6, for a brief summary in English of 
the historical development of criminal sanctions in Germany from these 
early times to the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, the post-war Allied 
decartelisation laws, the Act against Restraints of Competition 1958, the 
practice of criminal courts since 1992 to classify certain forms of bid rigging 
as criminal fraud, and the eventual introduction of the bid-rigging offence in 
§ 298 of the German Criminal Code.
of anticompetitive conduct is not, as is sometimes 
claimed, a “US import” that has no support in European 
culture: the 1797 decree stated in the preamble that the 
mischief of bid-rigging agreements was their “immoral 
and illegal selfishness.” 
38. From a utilitarian perspective, the reasons for crim-
inalisation seem overwhelming—but one has to proceed 
with great caution in the implementation. Whether crim-
inalisation is desirable depends very much on the institu-
tions in each jurisdiction. Where, for example, it is impos-
sible to allow for criminal immunity, competition law 
should not be criminalised, lest leniency programmes be 
undermined. For Germany, at least, this is simply not the 
case: while constitutional arguments against immunity 
provisions have often been made, they have not succeeded 
in the courts, and the immunity from criminal enforce-
ment for criminal tax avoidance in §  371 AO clearly 
shows that where there is a will, there is a way. In any 
case, the already existing criminal rules in the Member 
States (regardless whether they are general, as in France, 
or limited to bid rigging, as in Germany) already require 
this particular issue to be resolved. Similar consider-
ations go for the other existing institutional deficien-
cies noted above.78 The European Union should lend a 
helping hand in “Regulation 2” that would overcome any 
remaining constitutional concerns in the Member States.
May criminalisation lead to over 
deterrence?
39.  Another argument against criminalisation is that 
it may lead to overdeterrence. To the extent the cartel 
offence is narrowly drafted to catch only horizontal 
hardcore cartels, this is arguably a negligible problem. 
One could still be apprehensive about some chilling 
effects on legitimate cooperation. Here, the possibil-
ity to exclude criminal liability where the arrangement 
was notified to the competition authority (along the 
lines of the revised cartel offence in the UK79) should be 
considered.
40.  What is more: arguments against criminalisation 
largely ignore the international dimension. At least to the 
extent a cartel affects import commerce into the US (or 
fulfils the FTAIA conditions), there already is criminal 
liability for Europeans.80 While this criminal liability in 
the US may have been a footnote in earlier times, today 
all potential cartelists should better factor the possibil-
ity of extradition into their calculation.81 The case of the 
Italian alleged member of the Marine Hose cartel that 
was extradited from Germany to the US signals a new 
78 Above §§ 21–28.
79 Here, I only refer to the notification to the competition authority; most of 
the other defences present issues that would better have been avoided. See 
Stephan, Purposive Interpretation, and Gilbert, both n. 17.
80 United States v. Nippon Paper, 109 F3d 1 (1st Cir 1997); United States v. 
Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837, 192 
L. Ed. 2d 875 (2015).
81 P. Girardet, “What if Uncle Sam Wants You?”: Principles and Recent Practice 
Concerning US Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases, (2010) 1 Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 286; see also A. Stephan, n. 75, 353. Ce
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era.82 Travelling even within Europe has become perilous 
for anyone who participates or participated in a cartel 
affecting the US. The US has negotiated extradition 
treaties with many countries over the last two decades. 
While these extradition treaties require double criminal-
ity, this criterion is fulfilled whenever there is “law in the 
books” in the Member State in question. Through this 
backdoor, even the largely or completely unenforced 
criminal provisions in some Member States can result in 
cartelists being ordered to “[g]o directly to Jail. Do not 
pass Go. Do not collect $200.”
41.  A more problematic aspect of multi-jurisdictional 
criminal enforcement is the complexity it creates for 
leniency programmes. In the single-jurisdictional context, 
it is relatively easy to conceive an immunity rule for the 
successful leniency applicant which reinforces rather 
than impedes the leniency programme. Things become 
much more difficult if  conduct leads to criminal liabil-
ity in several jurisdictions and a leniency applicant is not 
certain to be the first in all these jurisdictions. Two solu-
tions to resolve this problem appear possible from a theo-
retical perspective. First, immunity provisions could let it 
suffice that the leniency applicant was first in any juris-
diction (or at least any EU or EEA jurisdiction). This, 
of course, could lead to gaming the system: all cartelists 
could avoid criminal liability by coordinating such that 
each of them is first in one jurisdiction. The second 
solution appears overdue in any case: to come up with 
an international clearing agency for leniency applica-
tions. On the level of the EU or EEA, such a clearing 
agency appears necessary anyway, given the malleable 
criteria for case allocation within the European Compe-
tition Network.83 
82 For the decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court rejecting the 
alleged cartelist’s constitutional challenge, see BVerfG, 17 February 2014, 
2 BvQ 4/14, WuW/E 4275—Auslieferung wegen Kartellverstoßes. For an 
analysis in English, see M Röhrig, Nowhere to Hide? Extradition in Antitrust 
Cases from a European Perspective, 6 Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice 168–76.
83 See, for some of the issues that may arise under the current system of 
independent leniency programmes, CJEU, 20.01.2016, DHL Express 
(Italy) v AGCM, case C-428/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:27. But see Competition 
and Markets Authority, Response to the European Commission’s Public 
Consultation on ‘Empowering the National Competition Authorities to be 
More Effective Enforcers’ (10 February 2016) §§ 45–51 (suggesting that 
national solutions are sufficient and that other states should copy the criminal 
immunity approach that the UK uses, but largely disregarding the cross-
jurisdictional effects in a network of national solutions).
IV. Conclusion
42. Criminal competition law enforcement is possible and 
desirable. However, great care has to be taken in its imple-
mentation. Criminal immunity must be provided for in 
order to protect leniency programmes. In the multi-ju-
risdictional context, the EU should provide both for a 
clearing agency for leniency applications, and for a prohi-
bition of individual sanctions for those who applied 
successfully for immunity under leniency programmes via 
the clearing agency. Institutionally, competition author-
ities should be well integrated into criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions. The prosecutions should prefera-
bly be centralised with a dedicated prosecutor instead of 
the decentralised local enforcement we currently see in 
Germany and France. Prosecutions should be well publi-
cised; this does not require that the names of the prose-
cuted individuals are made public where privacy concerns 
prevail. However, deterrence can only work if  sanctions 
are not only imposed, but also seen to be imposed. n
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Individual criminal sanctions 
in France
David Viros
david.viros@autoritedelaconcurrence.fr
Chief of Staff, Head of International and European affairs, Autorité de la concurrence, Paris
1. There is a growing insistence, amongst scholars, prac-
titioners or lawmakers interested or involved in compe-
tition policy and enforcement, on the need to comple-
ment corporate fines with fines on individuals, in order 
to increase deterrence and align the interests of staff and 
management with those of shareholders, the latter bearing 
in practice the brunt of the corporate fine. This call was 
made only recently by the European Parliament in its reso-
lution on the Annual report on EU Competition Policy.1 
However, such demands oftentimes are made together with 
a critical appraisal of the growing level of corporate fines.2 
2. There is a wide array of systems within the EEA foresee-
ing individual sanctions for antitrust infringements: while 
17 Member States foresee only criminal sanctions and 5 
only administrative sanctions, 3 comprise a mix of criminal 
and administrative sanctions, with the remaining 4 includ-
ing no provisions within their legal framework on individual 
antitrust sanctions.3 Interestingly, the landscape of individ-
ual sanctions in the EEA is the reverse image of the situa-
tion as regards corporate fines, with only 4 Member States 
in which a criminal or quasi-criminal system is in place. 
3. The French legal system reflects the binary distinction 
criminal/individual vs. administrative/corporate, which 
holds sway in a majority of Member States. This contri-
bution aims to account for the specificities, borne out 
of history, experience and necessity, which bring none-
theless to the French criminal system of enforcement its 
unique features.
1 European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2016 on the Annual report 
on EU Competition Policy: “29. Considers that the existing rules on fines 
to be imposed on legal persons for infringements must be supplemented by 
concomitant penalties against the natural persons responsible; takes the 
view that the fines should be high enough to act as a deterrent; emphasises 
the importance of a successful whistleblower policy, which has allowed the 
Commission to detect cartels.”
2 See, for example, Ian Forrester’s intervention at the Bundeskartellamt’s 
17th International Conference on Competition mentioned in 
“Le Bundeskartellamt organise sa 17ème conférence internationale à Berlin 
et rassemble la communauté de la concurrence pour faire un état des lieux 
des convergences et divergences sur les sujets brûlants”, D.V., Concurrences 
No. 2-2015. The European Parliament’s above-mentioned resolution may also 
implicitly allude to the level of corporate fines: “30. Regards legal certainty as 
crucial, and calls on the Commission to incorporate the rules on fines, such as 
those imposed in cartel proceedings, into a legislative instrument.”
3 Source: ECN, February 2014. Figures only account for custodial and pecuniary 
sanctions. Disqualification orders, in particular, are not taken into account. 
Specific criminal sanctions only applicable to bid-rigging practices are, for the 
purpose of this estimate, counted as criminal antitrust sanctions.
4. The first provisions foreseeing the sanction of antitrust 
infringements under French law were criminal in nature 
and hail back to 1810 and Napoleonic rule. Article 419 
of the former Criminal Code thus provided that he “who, 
by reunion or coalition amongst the main holders of a 
same merchandise or good, seeks not to sell it, or only at 
a certain price” or “who, by whichever fraudulent means 
or ways, brings the price of goods or merchandise upwards 
or downwards (…) above or below the prices which natural 
competition and free trade would have determined,” is 
liable to a maximum of one year imprisonment and ten 
thousand francs in penalty. The wording was partially 
revised in 1926, the maximum custodial sentence was 
extended to two years and the maximum fine increased, 
but these provisions essentially remained the same for 
176 years, until 1986, when the independent, administra-
tive, enforcement of competition law was established. 
5. In conjunction with these provisions, separate antitrust 
prohibitions, likewise on a criminal law basis, were intro-
duced in the period following the Second World War. 
Two executive orders (ordonnances) of 30 June 1945, 
initially adopted to deflect looming inflation and manage 
shortages, were subsequently amended by a decree of 9 
August 1953 and a law of 2 July 1963, which introduced 
cartel (the 1945 executive order was initially restricted 
to price cartels) and abuse of dominance prohibitions 
under French law. These prohibitions mirror to a signifi-
cant extent the wording of current antitrust prohibitions 
foreseen under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.
6.  This system of criminal antitrust enforcement relied 
on the determination of the liability of the individ-
ual infringer, management or staff, and the imposition 
of sanctions thereupon, for which the undertaking was 
held jointly and severally liable.4 This criminal model was 
in force in a context, post-war France, in which central-
ized economic planning by the State was prevalent and 
took precedence over the implementation of fledgling 
4 Article 56 of Executive Order 45-1484 of 30 June 1945. Ce
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instruments of competition enforcement.5 A marked 
shift was witnessed in the late 1970s with the passing of 
important legislative reforms bolstering the profile of 
the renamed Commission de la concurrence, culminat-
ing in 1986 with the creation of the Conseil de la concur-
rence6, immediate predecessor to the present Autorité de 
la concurrence. The targets of enforcement have hence-
forth been undertakings and legal persons, through the 
imposition of administrative fines and injunctions. 
7. However, lawmakers did not forgo in 1986 the possi-
bility to sanction individuals but circumscribed instead 
the remit of criminal antitrust law to them. Accordingly, 
administrative and criminal enforcement have coexisted 
ever since, in relation respectively to legal persons, on the 
one hand, and natural persons on the other.7 
I. Individual criminal 
sanctions: Article 
L. 420-6 of the 
Commercial Code
8. Pursuant to Article L. 420-6 of the Commercial Code, 
“If any natural person fraudulently takes a personal and 
decisive part in the conception, organization or implemen-
tation of the practices referred to in Articles L. 420-1 and 
L. 420-2 [anti-competitive practices], this shall be punished 
by an imprisonment of four years and a fine of 75,000 euros.”
9. From the outset, it must be noted that besides the exist-
ence of an anti-competitive practice,8 three cumulative 
elements must be proven to incur a criminal sanction, 
whether pecuniary or custodial. The involvement of the 
individual concerned must be (i) personal in the accom-
plishment of the competition infringement, as well as (ii) 
decisive and (iii) fraudulent.
5 See The role of competition Policy in regulatory reform – Regulatory reform 
in France, OECD, 2004. By way of illustration, the commission technique des 
ententes et positions dominantes, advisory body set up to provide expertise 
and support to the Minister of Economics in matters relating to antitrust law 
and the institutional predecessor of the current French competition authority, 
issued 133 opinions on cases from 1953 to 1977, 23 of which led to a 
transmission to the Public Prosecutor with ultimately 8 convictions (figures 
quoted in Inflation, État et opinion en France de 1948 à 1952, M.-P. Chélini).
6 Executive Order (ordonnance) 86-1243 of 1 December 1986
7 Article 54 of Law No. 2004-204 of 9 March 2004 (“loi Perben”) eschewed the 
so-called “speciality principle” which restricted corporate criminal liability to 
offences which explicitly provided for the liability of legal persons. As a consequence, 
pursuant to Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code, this entails that undertakings were 
liable in the same manner as individuals for all crimes and offences from 1 January 
2006. A doctrinal debate is ongoing as to whether this can be extended to criminal 
antitrust violations under Article L. 420-6 of the Code of Commerce, which 
explicitly refers to a “natural person” (“personne physique”), and the consequence, 
should this be the case, in relation to the application of the ne bis in idem principle.
8 In the absence of reference to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and seeing as 
criminal prohibitions must be strictly interpreted, pursuant to Article 111-4 
of the Criminal Code, the criminal sanctions set out under Article L. 420-6 
do not apply to 101/102 infringements, with limited practical consequences 
inasmuch as the substantive requirements of Articles L. 420-1 and L. 420-2 
are aligned with their EU counterparts.
10. The involvement is personal if  the individual takes part 
in person in the series of acts, or part thereof (meetings, 
exchange of information, etc.), that are the material 
support of the antitrust infringement. The offence is thus 
linked to the person who materially participates in the 
infringement rather than to the person who is the legal 
representative or exerts strategic or operational control 
over the concerned activity, if  she or he is different.9
11. The involvement must also be decisive, thus limiting 
the scope of the offence to the individuals who are active 
in the infringement, not only by their presence, but also 
because of the role they played when initiating or actually 
organizing the infringement. This does not preclude 
holding a plurality of persons, within a single undertak-
ing, responsible should they each have played a decisive 
role, respectively, as regards the conception, the organiza-
tion and the implementation of the practice.
12.  Finally, the fraudulent intent requirement adds to 
the burden of proof by seemingly requiring that the indi-
vidual, not only took a deliberate and conscious part in 
the infringement, but also manifested, in his actions, a 
bad faith element through deceptive means or attempts 
at concealment. This sets the bar high for a finding of 
misdemeanour under Article L. 420-6 and explains why 
convictions so far have been mostly limited to bid-rig-
ging cases, with Article L. 420-6 convictions oftentimes 
combining counts of misuse of company assets, corrup-
tion or favouritism.10 This somewhat ancillary nature 
of criminal antitrust convictions is also reflected in its 
decentralized enforcement: prosecution is carried out at 
the district level, before the territorially competent court, 
as opposed to serious tax or securities fraud which is 
prosecuted by a national, specialized public prosecutor.
13.  Since its entry into force, convictions under Article 
L.  420-6 have remained scarce, albeit not insignificant. 
Based on available figures regarding the first two decades 
of enforcement of Article L.  420-6,11 an average of 
9 This clear intention of ascribing criminal liability to the individual who took a 
direct and material part in the infringement is apparent in the Report drafted 
by the Working Group presided by Jean Donnedieu de Vabres, then Head of 
the Commission de la concurrence, which submitted to the Government a 
draft text which greatly inspired the 1986 Ordonnance : “Il y aurait poursuite 
pénale de nature délictuelle à l’égard de la personne physique qui ʻaurait 
pris une part déterminante dans la conception, l’organisation, la mise en 
œuvre ou le contrôle de telles pratiques’ en agissant ʻpar contrainte, abus 
d’autorité, dissimulation ou tout autre moyen frauduleux’. On aboutit ainsi à 
une délimitation plus précise des domaines pénal et non pénal. L’article 56 
de l’ordonnance no 45-1484 du 30 juin 1945 créant en matière économique 
une responsabilité pénale du commettant ne serait pas repris. Ne pourrait 
être déféré devant le tribunal correctionnel que celui qui est responsable de 
son propre fait.”
10 E.g., Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation (hereafter, “Crim. 
Chamber”), 16 May 2001, 97-80888 99-83467: the defendant, sitting at the 
committee reviewing the bids and holding an electoral mandate at the local, 
contracting, authority, was charged and convicted of “passive” corruption, 
embezzlement, breach of trust, fraudulent participation in a cartel as well as of 
being an accessory to misuse of company assets. See, for further information 
on the interplay between anti-corruption and antitrust enforcement, the French 
contribution to the OECD Global Forum on Competition of February 2014: 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/fev14_corruption_uk.pdf. 
11 Source : Internal figures, Autorité de la concurrence ; Les poursuites 
pénales contre les auteurs de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, Concurrences 
No. 2-2006, E. David. Ce
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two cases per year have led to pecuniary and/or custo-
dial sentences, the latter consisting, for the most part, 
in suspended prison terms. In five instances, convicted 
offenders were actually jailed, serving up to one-year 
sentences.12
14.  A case in point is the Ile-de-France high-school 
bid-rigging cartel, which involved 14 undertakings imple-
menting for 7 years a concerted and organized effort to 
allocate amongst themselves 88 public works tenders 
launched by the Ile-de-France region to renovate public 
schools. The contracts amounted to a total of 10 billion 
French francs (circa €1.5 billion). This wide-spread bid 
rigging was encouraged by officials of the contracting 
authority, as part of a kickback scheme, and facilitated 
by the assistant to the contracting authority, itself  chosen 
by the said authority in order to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the cartel and kickback effort. On appeal, convic-
tions for 11 offenders were upheld, with fines in the range 
of €10,000 to €120,000 and 6 prison sentences ranging 
from 10 month suspended term to 3 years, of which 2 
were suspended. The French competition authority fined 
the undertakings involved a total of €47.3  million for 
their liability under Article L. 420-1 of the Commercial 
Code, a sum which reflected the cap on fines as it was set 
at the time of the practices13.
II. Interplay between 
administrative and 
criminal proceedings
15. The prosecution of criminal antitrust infringements 
resides fully within the remit of the public prosecutor. 
The Autorité de la concurrence cannot launch, investigate 
nor sanction violations of Article L. 420-6. Conversely, 
the Autorité de la concurrence is fully responsible for the 
launch, investigation and sanction of infringements to 
Articles L. 420-1 and L. 420-2 and their EU Law equiv-
alent. However, this clear dividing line between adminis-
trative and criminal enforcement does not exclude some 
level of interplay and mutually reinforcing cooperation.
16.  Firstly, the rules governing limitation periods and 
their interruption reflect a continuum between criminal 
and administrative proceedings as part of a broader 
public enforcement. Thus, investigatory action by the 
Autorité de la concurrence will interrupt the running of 
the limitation period applicable to criminal proceedings, 
12 Crim. Chamber, 9 November 1995, 94-84204; Tribunal correctionnel (first 
instance court), 13 novembre 1997, Asphalt mix case; Crim. Chamber, 16 May 
2001, 99-83467 97-80888; Tribunal correctionnel, 30 June 1999, Grenoble 
regional hospital case; Crim. Chamber, 20 February 2008, 02-82676 
07-82110.
13 Five pour cent national turnover in the last full year prior to the decision. 
As of 16 May 2001, this cap was increased to 10% of the highest worldwide 
yearly group turnover from amongst the accounting years between the year 
prior to the inception of the infringement and the year prior to the infringement 
decision. 
as foreseen by Article L. 420-6, paragraph 3. Conversely, 
investigatory action by the public prosecutor in respect 
of an infringement to Article L. 420-6 will interrupt the 
running of the limitation period applicable to admin-
istrative proceedings: the Civil Chamber of the Cour 
de cassation grounded this solution on the fact that the 
material element of a violation of Article L. 420-6 rests 
in part on the finding of a violation of Article L. 420-1, 
to which Article L. 420-6 refers; this commonality in the 
object of investigations pursued by the public prosecu-
tor and the Autorité results in the actions of the former 
interrupting the limitation period applicable to proceed-
ings before the latter. This solution is now enshrined in 
Article L. 462-7. Together, these rules on the interruption 
of the limitation period safeguard the effectiveness of the 
reciprocal means by which the Autorité and the author-
ities charged with criminal enforcement refer cases and 
files to one another (see below). This holds particularly 
true when the Autorité refers a case to the public pros-
ecutor, as such a referral is made concurrently with the 
adoption of the infringement decision, therefore at the 
very end of the administrative proceedings.
the very end of the administrative proceedings.
The public prosecutor or the investigating 
judge may give the Autorité access 
to the criminal investigation file
17. Secondly, the public prosecutor or the investigating 
judge may give the Autorité access to the criminal investi-
gation file so as to substantiate the latter’s own proceed-
ings regarding similar facts. Article L.  463-5 of the 
Commercial Code reads: “Investigating and decision-mak-
ing courts can disclose to the Autorité de la concurrence, 
at its request, the minutes, the investigation reports or any 
other documents relative to the criminal proceedings which 
have a direct link to the facts under assessment by the 
Autorité.” Such communication interrupts time limits.14
18. The Autorité is entitled to use this evidence to find an 
infringement, as long as all the parties are given access 
to the evidence communicated by the public prosecu-
tor or the investigative judge, during the course of the 
administrative proceedings, and thus allowed to dispute 
its content and the conditions under which they were 
obtained.15 
19. Pursuant to article L. 463-5, the Autorité requested 
several times the disclosure of criminal evidence, which 
subsequently served as evidence to find an administrative 
infringement. Indeed, five decisions of the Autorité in the 
last ten years relied in part on criminal evidence: Road 
public works in the Seine-Maritime department16 (2005), 
14 Commercial Chamber of the Cour de cassation, 15 January 2008, 07-11.677 
07-12.132 07-12.357.
15 Crim. Chamber, 13 October 2009, 08-17269 08-17476 08-17484 08-17616 
08-17622 08-17640 08-17641 08-17642 08-17669 08-17772 08-17773 
08-21132.
16 Decision 05-D-69 of 15 December 2005. Ce
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public procurement in the Ile-de-France region17 (2006), 
High schools in the Ile-de-France region18 (2007), Road 
signs (2010)19 and Monument restoration (2011).20
20.  The investigatory powers of the investigative judge 
exceed those of the Autorité’s agents: the evidence thus 
communicated can present the Autorité with some “smoking 
guns” it would not have been in a capacity to obtain other-
wise. These powers include in particular the interception, 
recording and transcription of telecommunication corre-
spondence, unbeknownst to those involved (Article 100 to 
100-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In the afore-
mentioned Monument restoration case, the Autorité, as per 
Article L.  463-5, obtained from the prosecutor hearings, 
seized documents and transcripts of telephone recordings, 
collected in the context of criminal proceedings initiated 
before the Rouen Criminal Court against the directors of a 
number of building firms for having participated in cartels 
involving the restoration of historic monuments. The 
content of wiretaps accounted significantly for the estab-
lishment of the impugned practices and the imposition, by 
the Autorité, of an overall fine of nearly €10 million. 
The investigative judge may request the assistance 
of an agent of the Autorité by letter rogatory, 
in order to conduct criminal investigations
21. Thirdly, the investigative judge may request the assis-
tance of an agent of the Autorité by letter rogatory, in 
order to conduct criminal investigations, pursuant to 
Article L.  450-1-IIbis of the Commercial Code, intro-
duced by a Law of 19 March 2014. The investigative “fire-
power” of the Autorité may thus support and increase the 
application of Article L. 420-6, while the judge’s prerog-
atives in directing the investigation and referring the case 
to the criminal court for judgment remain intact. Two 
requests have been lodged to date, for which assistance is 
currently being provided.
22. Fourthly, the criminal judge can request the Autorité’s 
opinion in a given case, pursuant to Article L.  462-3, 
which opens to any court, whether civil, administrative 
or criminal, this possibility, provided the question relates 
to the application of Article L.  420-1 and/or L. 420-2. 
As  mentioned above, the violation of Article L.  420-1 
and/or L. 420-2 being one of the material elements of a 
finding pursuant to Article L. 420-6, the criminal judge 
is thus entitled to seek the Autorité’s opinion. It remains 
to be seen whether the possibility now offered to the 
investigative judge to request the Autorité’s assistance in 
the investigation will diminish the incentives to seek the 
Autorité’s formal opinion on the matter (in particular as 
regards requests for opinion issued by the investigative 
judge himself, which he has standing to do21). 
17 Decision 06-D-07 of 21 mars 2006.
18 Decision 07-D-15 of 9 May 2007.
19 Decision 10-D-39 of 22 December 2010.
20 Decision 11-D-02 of 26 January 2011.
21 E.g., Opinion 99-A-20 of 23 November 1999.
Cooperation goes both ways and 
the Autorité may take the initiative 
to communicate, on its own motion, 
its case-file to the public prosecutor
23. Finally, cooperation goes both ways and the Autorité 
may take the initiative to communicate, on its own motion, 
its case-file to the public prosecutor when it considers 
that the facts at hand warrant an Article L.420-6 inves-
tigation. This action interrupts the limitation period for 
prosecuting the said practices.
24. This provision has been applied moderately, with 
10 cases sent to the public prosecutor’s office since 1994, 
although there has been a definite increase since 2000, 
mostly in relation to bid-rigging cases for public procure-
ments. After transmission of the file, the outcome of the 
criminal procedure very much depends on the public 
prosecutor concerned, in whose hands lies the power to 
prosecute the infringement.
25.  The adoption of the Autorité’s first leniency notice 
in 2006 and the significant contribution of the leniency 
programme towards the attainment of the objectives of 
effective and deterrent enforcement, with 10 cartel deci-
sions issued so far on the basis of one or several leniency 
applications for a total of circa €3 billion in fines, have 
made it necessary to acknowledge the need to maintain 
incentives to apply for leniency, when considering trans-
mitting a case-file to the public prosecutor. The Autorité 
has thus publicly stated, in its leniency notice, that it 
considers that the existence of a leniency application is a 
legitimate reason for abstaining to communicate the file 
to the public prosecutor. 
26. In January 2008, an official report, known as 
the Rapport Coulon, after the presiding member of 
the commission, a former president of the Paris Court of 
Appeal,22 was submitted to the Minister of Justice. Its main 
aim was to reflect on corporate offences and introduce 
greater consistency, where needed, between criminal and 
administrative offences in the area of company, distribu-
tion and consumer law. The report suggested introducing 
a leniency system for individuals, in the form of a certi-
fication by the public prosecutor of the leniency appli-
cation submitted to the Autorité. This recommendation 
is echoed, several years after, by the European Commis-
sion’s focus, in the context of its recent public consulta-
tion on the “empowerment of national competition author-
ities” as well as in its Communication on the ten years of 
Regulation 1/2003,23 on the issue of the interplay between 
leniency programmes and sanctions on individuals. n
22 La dépénalisation de la vie des affaires, Rapport au Garde des Sceaux, 
ministre de la Justice, janvier 2008.
23 Communication from the Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement 
under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (COM(2014) 
453, 9.7.2014).
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Individual sanctions in 
German competition law: 
The case for a criminalisation 
of antitrust offences?*
Daniel Zimmer
zimmer@jura.uni-bonn.de
Professor of Law, University of Bonn, Faculty of Law 
Director of the Institute for Commercial and Trade Law and the Center for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics (CASTLE) 
I. Introduction
1.  The optimal design of competition law enforcement 
by authorities and private parties currently consti-
tutes a focal point in the legal and political discussion 
of competition law in Germany. The conception of the 
official system of sanctioning, especially under the law 
of regulatory offences, is the subject of broad discus-
sion in Germany, and encompasses problems of consti-
tutional law and procedural law,1 as well as aspects of 
corporate liability.2 One issue to come up in recent years 
in the discussion on an effective system of sanctions is 
whether it is in the interest of an improved cartel enforce-
ment to criminalise other hard-core violations besides 
bid rigging which is a criminal offence (Sec. 298 of the 
German Criminal Code). Similar debate has taken place 
before in Germany, at the time of the enactment of the 
Act against Restraints of Competition, but also in the 
1970s and 1980s, although the discussion did not find 
its way into the statutes.3 Current impetus for considera-
* The presentation is based on the Chapter “Kriminalisierung 
von Kartellrechtsverstößen in Deutschland” in the Twentieth Biennial 
Report 2012/2013 by the German Monopolies Commission (published in 
2014). A more extended version has been presented at the Conference, The 
Fight against Hard Core Cartels: Trends, Challenges and Best International 
Practices, in November 2014 in Madrid. Many thanks go to Ms. Alison Felmy 
for translating the text.
1 Cf. Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) decision of 26 February 2013, Case No. 
KRB 20/12 — Grauzementkartell. 
2 In this respect, the law on regulatory offences was developed further in the 
eighth amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition, which 
entered into force in June of 2013. The future conception of the procedure for 
competition law fines was also a topic of discussion for the Working Group on 
Competition Law of the Bundeskartellamt in the year 2012: Bundeskartellamt, 
Hintergrundpapier zur Tagung des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht am 4. Oktober 
2012, Kartellbußgeldverfahren zwischen deutschem Systemdenken und 
europäischer Konvergenz. 
3 Cf. M. Dreher, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2011, p. 232 et seq. n. 11 with 
further references.
tions on extending the criminalisation of competition law 
violations comes for the most part from the US, where 
such violations are traditionally prosecuted not only in 
civil court but also under criminal law, as well as from 
certain EU Member States that have recently introduced 
criminal sanctions in this area.4 The OECD has also 
repeatedly dealt with this topic in recent years.5 
2.  The discussion on extending the criminalisation of 
competition law violations focuses on the criminal 
enforcement of so-called hard-core cartels, that is, hori-
zontal price, output and territorial cartels. The German 
Monopolies Commission considers a restriction of 
possible legislative measures to hard-core cartels to be 
appropriate and—for constitutional reasons—neces-
sary. For one thing, it is generally agreed that such cartels 
cause particularly severe damage, which is why they are 
prohibited in all competition law regimes of the EU 
Member States, in the law of the European Union and in 
many other legal systems. Secondly, the threat of criminal 
sanction exclusively for horizontal hard-core cartels 
precludes the risk of over-regulation. If  one affirms the 
potential of criminal penalties to have a higher deter-
rent effect, the risk could arise that those in charge of 
a company would refrain even from behaviour that is 
legal and competitively efficient simply for fear of crim-
inal-law consequences. Such a risk is particularly high 
when the delimitation of legal and illegal conduct is diffi-
cult. We can assume this to be true in the area of vertical 
agreements, but also with unilateral conduct in the area 
of abuse control. The same kind of difficulties do not, 
however, arise with horizontal price, output and territo-
rial cartels. In this respect, there are no legal grey zones; 
4 Criminal penalties were introduced e.g. in Ireland and the UK; there are 
also tendencies toward decriminalisation, however, e.g. in Austria and the 
Netherlands.
5 OECD, Policy Roundtables 2003 Cartel Sanctions against Individuals, DAF/
COMP(2004)39, 10 January 2005. Ce
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rather, hard-core cartels generally paint a clear picture in 
terms of illegality. Limiting the criminal prosecution to 
especially severe competition-law violations would have 
the additional advantage of avoiding extensive economic 
balancing tests in the course of a criminal procedure. 
II. Competition Law 
enforcement practice: 
Administrative fines 
and criminal statistics
3. In recent years, the fines imposed by the Bundeskartel-
lamt have increased drastically. Since 2007, each 
year’s total has continually amounted to more than 
€180  million, and in some years the total has been far 
higher. According to the authority’s own statistics, the 
fines for the years 2012 to 2014 have steadily increased. 
In 2014, the total exceeded the sum of €1 billion.6
4. The Bundeskartellamt does not publish detailed statisti-
cal information on the number of cartel cases prosecuted 
or the decisions issued that involve fines. The most recent 
reports on its activities do, however, provide insights on 
a number of significant cartel cases and the individual 
decisions issued regarding undertakings, associations of 
undertakings and natural persons. The report for 2011-
2012 alone includes 19 cartel cases of great significance 
and over 220 decisions on fines.7 
5.  The criminal statistics concerning Sec. 298 of the 
Criminal Code (bid rigging) have presented considerable 
numbers of cases for the past several years. In the period 
from 2003 to 2012, these show that between 42 and 230 
cases were handled each year. In the years 2011 and 2012 
there were 53 and 115 cases noted, respectively. These 
statistics include all violations registered with the police, 
however; not in every case was there a charge brought 
by the public prosecutor, or main proceedings instituted 
by the court, much less a conviction. We can therefore 
obtain a better impression from the numbers provided by 
the Federal Statistics Office, which inform us that in the 
years from 2008 to 2012 there were 20, 19, 17, 20 and 22 
convictions made.8 A prison sentence was issued in five 
cases in 2008, three cases in 2009, one case in 2010 and 
in seven cases in 2011; in the year 2012 only fines were 
issued.9
6 http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Interviews/DE/WIWO_ 
Rekordjahr.html.
7 Bundeskartellamt, Report of Activities 2011-2012, BT-Drs. 17/13675, p. 30 f.
8 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3, 2008, p. 70, 2009, p. 70, 
2010, p. 72, 2011, p. 70 and 2012, p. 72. Wagner-von Papp points out that in 
the statistics, a case with unity and plurality of acts is listed only under the 
act incurring the highest punishment: F. Wagner-von Papp, Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 2009, p. 1236 et seq., 1243 and n. 51.
9 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3, 2008, p. 102, 2009, p. 102, 
2010, p. 106, 2011, p. 102 and 2012, p. 106.
III. Sufficient 
deterrent effect 
of the current system 
of sanctioning?
6. A central question in the discussion of farther-reach-
ing criminalisation of competition law violations—
going beyond the specific constellation of bid rigging—
is whether the deterrent effect that the existing official 
and private possibilities of sanctions have on compa-
nies and natural persons is strong enough. The threat 
and the imposition of sanctions are intended to create 
incentives to act in a manner in conformity with competi-
tion law. Current members of a cartel are supposed to be 
kept from carrying on with the cartel, potential members 
kept from forming new ones. An indication that such 
prevention is not sufficient could be seen—albeit on the 
surface—in the increased numbers of cases and fines. 
Such an argument would be short-sighted, however, for 
it fails to consider that the legal conditions for combating 
cartels have changed drastically in the last few years, and 
the competition authorities have greatly intensified their 
activities in this area.
7.  As regards the high number of cases, a factor that 
deserves particular mention is the introduction of the 
“Bonus Rule” by the Bundeskartellamt in the year 2000, 
which was amended and expanded in 2006. According to 
the authority, this rule played a central role in the detec-
tion of cartel violations, both directly and indirectly. 
In enforcing the cases on which it receives direct notifi-
cation, the Bundeskartellamt often receives information 
on further violations that would otherwise have gone 
unnoticed. Another factor to be named in this context 
is the introduction in June 2012 of an informant system 
that facilitates the anonymous reporting of cartel viola-
tions. Furthermore, one can observe that the competi-
tion authorities in recent years have focused their activity 
on the prosecution of cartels, a policy that is reflected in 
the very formation of three divisions of the Bundeskartel-
lamt that have the sole task of prosecuting misconduct 
in connection with violations of Sec. 1 GWB and Art. 
101 TFEU. This shift of focus, in turn, is likely closely 
connected with the introduction of the Bonus Rule and 
the possibility of closing a case by settlement, which 
makes the detection and quick prosecution of cartels 
easier. It should not be ruled out, furthermore, that the 
competition authorities exert their discretion under the 
discretionary principle more frequently than they once 
did in favour of taking up potential cartel cases. Finally, 
it may be due in part to improved cooperation and recip-
rocal information in the network of European compe-
tition authorities that cartel violations have been prose-
cuted more often and with greater success. 
8. Not only the basic conditions for governmental prose-
cution of competition law violations, but also the condi-
tions for private enforcement of competition law have 
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been developed further in the last few years. With  the 
seventh amendment of the Act against Restraints of 
Competition, such provisions were introduced as the 
binding effect of competition agencies’ decisions on 
damage compensation claims of third parties who 
had suffered damages and the mandatory payment of 
interest on damages. The Act’s eighth amendment led 
to an expansion of the collective claims law, in that Sec. 
33(2), No. 2, of the Act against Restraints of Competi-
tion now granted consumer collectives in particular the 
right to claim an injunction as well as third-party profits 
in cases of mass or scattered damages. The new Damages 
Directive10 will signal only a slight need for adjustment, 
as German law on the whole already is in line with the 
Directive.11
9. Although private compensation claims are still as a rule 
follow-on claims of cartel victims who do not directly 
contribute to the detection of competition law violations, 
still the risk has recently grown that companies partic-
ipating in cartels will be confronted with considerable 
damages claims.12 This risk is especially great when the 
damages are incurred not by the end consumer, but by 
companies or other legal persons. It is true that orders 
to pay damages have until now been the exception to the 
rule.13 However, in some individual cases that ended in 
settlements a considerable monetary compensation was 
obtained.14 It is furthermore not out of the question 
that damaged companies that continue to do business 
with cartel members may obtain a certain compensation 
within this framework, for instance in the form of future 
rebates. 
10. In addition to these measures, and due in part to the 
intensified official and private enforcement of competi-
tion law violations in the recent past, awareness within 
the companies of the issue of conduct contravening 
competition law has undergone a change. The extent of 
this change in awareness likely varies depending on sector 
10 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance, OJ 2014 L 349/1.
11 On this see P. Stauber and H. Schaper, Die Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie 
– Handlungsbedarf für den deutschen Gesetzgeber?, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Kartellrecht 2014, 346 et seq.; see also e.g. H. Schweitzer, Die neue Richtlinie 
für kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht 
2014, 335 et seq.
12 Deutsche Bahn brings an action against rail cartel, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
20 December 2012, http://www.fr-online.de/wirtschaft/bahn-klagt-
gegen-ex-schienenkartell-um-thyssenkrupp,1472780,21154944.html; 
Municipal transportation services file suit against rail cartel, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 21 February 2013, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/
schienenkartell-zu-lasten-der-deutschen-bahn-kommunen-vor-klage-
gegen-schienenfreunde-1.1605741; Deutsche Bahn and 15 municipalities 
file suit against escalator cartel, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/
aufzugs-und-rolltreppen-kartell-wiederholungstaeter-thyssen-krupp-droht-
millionenzahlung-1.1540752; Commission goes to court over damages 
suffered from elevators cartel, Press release of the European Commission, 
IP/08/998 of 24 June 2008.
13 Mannheim District Court, decision of 4 May 2012, Case No. 7 O 463/11 Kart 
– Feuerlöschfahrzeuge.
14 http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/thyssen128.html, as of 11 March 2014, 
reporting that the Deutsche Bahn and ThyssenKrupp agreed to a settlement in 
the rail cartel case in the amount of €150 million.
and company. And yet, one must acknowledge that the 
overall significance of compliance measures in compa-
nies has increased in recent years. Another area receiving 
more and more attention concerns the possibilities and 
duties of management and supervisory committees of 
the company caught up in a cartel to raise claims against 
employees who are responsible for cartel activities and 
to enforce personnel consequences.15 Such measures that 
directly impact the responsible party can develop a not 
inconsiderable deterrent effect if  they are applied consist-
ently. It must be remembered, however, that this develop-
ment is still in its fledgling stage.
11. The fact that both official and private cartel enforce-
ment are currently undergoing changes makes it very 
difficult to give a conclusive assessment of their deterrent 
effect. It is possible that the existing system of sanctions 
has not yet reached the full height of its preventive effect. 
This is intensified by the fact that many of the cartels 
detected and prosecuted in the past few years, such as the 
hydrogen peroxide cartel or the escalator cartel, go back 
to the beginning of the century, or as far as the 1990s. 
However, in the opinion of the Monopolies Commission, 
there are several reasons to believe that the current system 
of sanctions is achieving only a meagre deterrent effect. 
At what amount do these fines realise 
a sufficient preventive effect?
12. When sanctions are threatened and imposed, the aim 
is to deter current and potential participants in cartels. 
Because, at least under the current system, the fines 
threatened by law and imposed by authorities on compa-
nies stand at the centre of the penalisation of competition 
law violations, one question is decisive: At what amount 
do these fines realise a sufficient preventive effect?
13.  According to the theory of optimal sanctions, 
companies calculate a potential fine into their decision 
of whether to act in conformity with or in contravention 
of competition law.16 The gains of violating competition 
law and the prospective costs of a violation are weighed 
against each other considering the probability of being 
penalised. In theory, determining the level of an effec-
tive fine is a matter of comparing values of expecta-
tion. A sufficient deterrent effect is only reached if  the 
fine equals at least the product of the expected profits 
from the cartel and the inverse of the expected probabil-
ity of discovery. For the probability that a cartel will be 
detected there are estimates with results between under 
15 H. Fleischer, Betriebs-Berater 2008, p. 1070 et seq.; C. Altemeier, 
Verantwortlichkeit des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße: Ein Beitrag zur 
Organhaftung und zur Organuntreue, Frankfurt, 2013; F.-J. Säcker, Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 2009, p. 3.
16 W. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust, University of Chicago Law 
Review 50 1983, 652 et seq. Ce
 d
oc
um
en
t e
st
 p
ro
té
gé
 a
u 
tit
re
 d
u 
dr
oi
t d
'a
ut
eu
r p
ar
 le
s 
co
nv
en
tio
ns
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
le
s 
en
 v
ig
ue
ur
 e
t l
e 
C
od
e 
de
 la
 p
ro
pr
ié
té
 in
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 d
u 
1e
r j
ui
lle
t 1
99
2.
 T
ou
te
 u
til
is
at
io
n 
no
n 
au
to
ris
ée
 c
on
st
itu
e 
un
e 
co
nt
re
fa
ço
n,
 d
él
it 
pé
na
le
m
en
t s
an
ct
io
nn
é 
ju
sq
u'
à 
3 
an
s 
d'
em
pr
is
on
ne
m
en
t e
t 3
00
 0
00
 €
 d
'a
m
en
de
 (a
rt
. 
L.
 3
35
-2
 C
PI
). 
L’
ut
ili
sa
tio
n 
pe
rs
on
ne
lle
 e
st
 s
tri
ct
em
en
t a
ut
or
is
ée
 d
an
s 
le
s 
lim
ite
s 
de
 l’
ar
tic
le
 L
. 1
22
 5
 C
PI
 e
t d
es
 m
es
ur
es
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 d
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
po
uv
an
t a
cc
om
pa
gn
er
 c
e 
do
cu
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
by
 c
op
yr
ig
ht
 la
w
s 
an
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
op
yr
ig
ht
 tr
ea
tie
s.
 N
on
-a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t 
co
ns
tit
ut
es
 a
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
is
he
r's
 ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 m
ay
 b
e 
pu
ni
sh
ed
 b
y 
up
 to
 3
 y
ea
rs
 im
pr
is
on
m
en
t a
nd
 u
p 
to
 a
 €
 3
00
 0
00
 fi
ne
 (A
rt
. L
. 3
35
-2
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
). 
Pe
rs
on
al
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t i
s 
au
th
or
is
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
lim
its
 o
f A
rt
. L
 1
22
-5
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 a
nd
 D
R
M
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
Concurrences N° 2-2016 I On Topic I Individual sanctions for competition law infringements: Pros, cons and challenges 31
20 to 33%.17 According to a widespread belief, the current 
level of fines therefore is not sufficient to deter all compa-
nies from entering into or continuing to participate in a 
cartel.18 To do so, the fines—the probability of discovery 
remaining the same—would have to be much higher than 
those currently being imposed.19
14. Besides the fact that often the necessary data to calcu-
late the optimal fine in a concrete cartel case are lacking, 
the prospect of again drastically raising fines is confronted 
with constitutional law concerns, among others, concern-
ing such principles as proportionality.20 Furthermore, 
a renewed increase of the fines imposed could lead in 
particular to jeopardising the existence of those compa-
nies involved, which would have further social conse-
quences on third parties, especially employees and cred-
itors. The Bundeskartellamt and the European Commis-
sion could certainly take account of the economic perfor-
mance of a company in the concrete individual case when 
determining the level of the fine.21 And yet, if  the Guide-
lines on fines were to announce that constrained economic 
performance, or a risk to economic viability, would result 
in a reduction of fines, this would simultaneously reduce 
the deterrent effect of the threatened sanctions. 
15.  In addition, companies in the current system can 
hope that dextrous maneuvering on their own part will 
leave them fine-free or with a reduced fine, owing to the 
Bonus Rule, if  they should one day expose the cartel or 
assist in its discovery.22 Therefore, the Bonus Rule cannot 
be stripped of all credit in bringing cartels to light (and 
prosecuting them). On the other hand, it contributes to 
a reduction of the deterrent effect of regulatory sanc-
tions, since adroit behaviour on the part of the cartel 
offender can achieve a remission or reduction of the 
fine.23 Such considerations will likewise be taken into 
account by economically rational-thinking representa-
tives of companies. Accordingly, the threat and imposi-
tion of  deterring fines should, under the theory of the 
optimal sanction, again be higher. 
17 P. Bryant and E. Eckhard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 1991, p. 531 et seq. (13 to 17% probability 
of detection). This estimate is based on the period of 1961-1988, however, 
which is before the European Commission and the Bundeskartellamt 
introduced leniency programmes; Wils therefore bases his calculation on a 
rate of 33% and considers a sufficient deterrent effect as given only for fines 
at or above 150% of the annual revenue generated by cartel products, W. Wils, 
Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Law Enforcement, §§ 550 et seq.
18 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten XIX, Subsec. 476 with further 
references.
19 Thus in the US fines of five times the amount of damages are under 
discussion; cf. R. Lande, and J. Connor, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: 
Crime Pays, Cardozo Law Review 34, 427-490.
20 W. Möschel, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010, p. 869 et seq., who sees the 
proportionality principle as already violated by the current amount of fines.
21 European Commission Guideline on the method of setting fines imposed 
pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, op. cit., § 35; 
Bundeskartellamt Guidelines for fines §§ 2, 16.
22 This idea also applies to the possibility of ending a proceeding by mutual 
consent to a settlement agreement. But here the reduction of the fine is 
limited to 10%, so the reduction of a deterrent effect should also be limited 
as compared to the Bonus Rule; cf. press release of the Bundeskartellamt of 
23 December 2013 on settlements.
23 K. Stockmann, Festschrift für Rainer Bechtold, 2006, p. 559, 567.
16.  The deterrent effect may be significantly less on 
natural persons. As explained already, the probabil-
ity that cartel violations will be detected is, as far as we 
currently know, around 30%. If  we assume that as a rule 
a good many natural persons participate in a cartel, and 
yet the European Commission cannot impose a fine on 
them, and the Bundeskartellamt only brings charges 
against a portion of the natural persons responsible for 
each cartel under the law on regulatory offences, the 
probability of being charged is again much smaller than 
in the case of punishing companies participating in a 
cartel. Therefore the deterrent effect must also be consid-
ered to be even less. Under these circumstances it seems 
quite questionable whether increasing the standard fines 
from €500,000 to €1  million for severe cases, or from 
€25,000 to €100,000 for minor competition offences in 
the framework of the seventh amendment of the Act 
against Restraints of Competition is enough to achieve 
an effective deterrence. 
17.  The preventive effect of fines on natural persons is 
furthermore doubtful when these can be sure to receive 
a corresponding compensation from their employers. 
Such compensation can be paid ex ante as well as ex post, 
for instance when a higher salary or an additional bonus 
is agreed upon before an authority discovers the cartel, 
or when the employee is reimbursed in the amount of the 
fine after a regulatory offence proceeding is conducted. 
18. Certainly, the legal admissibility of such compensa-
tion payments is increasingly being called into question. 
In this context, the discussion focuses on questions of 
the social and criminal liability of those who arrange for 
compensation to be paid out of company assets. Among 
the measures being considered are damage compensation 
claims on grounds of breach of obligations pursuant 
to Sec. 93 of the Stock Corporation Act (AktG) or 
criminal liability on grounds of breach of trust accord-
ing to Sec. 266 of the Civil Code.24 A criminal liability 
based on obstruction of punishment, on the other hand, 
is normally out of the question because there is at least 
presently no offence at hand—with the exception of bid 
rigging—on which this could be based. Another point to 
be made is that, at least when no direct compensation is 
made subsequent to the fine, it will be difficult to prove 
there was compensation. 
19. Finally, the deterrent effect of individual fines would 
fall to zero if  the risk of actually having to pay a fine out 
of one’s own pocket could be ruled out by means of an 
insurance policy. As far as Directors and Officers (D&O) 
insurance is concerned, however, we must assume that 
an offender has no claim to compensation, at least when 
deliberate conduct has been proven.
24 H. Fleischer, Betriebs-Berater 2008, p. 1070 et seq.; C. Altemeier, 
Verantwortlichkeit des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße: Ein Beitrag zur 
Organhaftung und zur Organuntreue, Frankfurt, 2013. Ce
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IV. Conclusion
20. The question of whether to extend the criminalisa-
tion of cartel violations constitutes an important aspect 
in the current discussion in competition law and policy 
on a system of adequate sanctions. In recent years, both 
official and private enforcement have undergone, and still 
are undergoing, far-reaching developments—in terms 
not only of legal parameters but also of their application 
in practice. This makes it difficult to estimate conclusively 
how deterrent the current system of sanctions actually 
is. Furthermore, it is possible that the latter has not yet 
reached its highest point of deterrent effect. This assess-
ment is supported by the fact that a number of cartels 
that have been detected and prosecuted in the last few 
years go back to the 1990s. The central question of the 
appropriate level of deterrence, therefore, calls for further 
investigation in the medium term.
21. And yet there are several reasons to believe that the 
deterrent effect of the current system of cartel sanc-
tions should be augmented. If  future analyses should 
confirm this assessment, the Monopolies Commis-
sion deems it worthwhile to consider particularly such 
measures with which incentives can be offered directly to 
personally responsible employees of a company. In this 
respect, a primarily criminal enforcement—going beyond 
bid rigging—of hard-core cartels could be taken into 
consideration. To increase the effectiveness of a possible 
criminal punishment, flanking measures would be neces-
sary; in particular, a criminal-law informant programme 
for cartel participants should be created, and the position 
of competition authorities in criminal proceedings 
fortified.
22.  Another sanction directly affecting the acting indi-
viduals and therefore leading to greater deterrence would 
be an occupational ban, to be imposed by competi-
tion authorities. Besides this, the probability of detect-
ing cartels could be increased by a regulatory reward for 
informers. The introduction of corporate criminal law, in 
contrast, is not a measure that the Monopolies Commis-
sion considers to be constructive, at least not in the area 
of competition law. n
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Criminal enforcement of 
competition law: Implications 
of US experience*
William E. Kovacic
wkovacic@law.gwu.edu
Visiting Professor, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London 
Global Professor of Competition Law, George Washington University Law School (on leave) 
Non-Executive Director, United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority
I. Introduction
1.  How should competition law punish offenders? 
In 1890, the United States answered this vital query by 
treating violations of the Sherman Act as crimes.1 Today 
criminal enforcement against companies and individu-
als anchors the Department of Justice (DOJ) campaign 
against cartels. The typical compliance talk on US law 
recites a steep modern increase in fines collected and 
prison terms served. For business officials around the 
world, the grim warning is the same: Get caught in a 
cartel that sells in America, and go to jail. 
2. It is hardly inevitable that other competition systems—
more than 125 jurisdictions have competition laws, and 
the number grows yearly—would emulate this feature 
of the US regime. Other nations might recoil from what 
they see to be another manifestation of an unhealthy 
American obsession with incarceration to enforce laws. 
Yet more than twenty jurisdictions have chosen to 
denominate some or all antitrust offenses as crimes.2 
Still others, concerned that even huge corporate fines 
deter cartels inadequately, are debating whether to add 
criminal sanctions.3
3. For actual and would-be adopters of criminal enforce-
ment, the US program is an indispensable point of refer-
ence. This article uses US experience to illuminate the 
institutional challenges that confront an antitrust regime 
* Parts of this article are adapted from William E. Kovacic, Criminal 
Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from US Experience, 
in A. Ezrachi and C. Beaton-Wells (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical 
Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011). The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
1 15 USC §§ 1–2.
2 A partial list includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. 
3 K. J. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel and F. O. W. Vogelaar (eds.), Criminalization of 
Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU 
Member States (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006).  
in going criminal. It takes no view on whether criminal 
enforcement improves the quality of competition policy.4 
Instead, it underscores the significant institutional conse-
quences that criminal enforcement entails. Among other 
tasks, criminal sanctions require a jurisdiction to:
–  Develop an internal norm within the enforce-
ment agencies that encourages employees to 
treat certain acts as extremely grave offenses 
worthy of aggressive investigation.
–  Persuade external constituencies—legislators, 
business officials, the bar, and the broader 
society (including potential jurors)—to respect 
an enforcement norm that deems certain anti-
trust violations to be worthy of criminal 
condemnation.
–  Convince courts and juries that wrongdoers 
deserve conviction and severe punishment.
–  Clearly delimit the category of offenses that 
will elicit criminal prosecution to avoid the fact 
or perception of unfair surprise in the applica-
tion of the law.
–  Accumulate evidence that provides a confident 
basis for prosecution and conviction.
–  Ensure that sanctions are sufficient to accom-
plish remedial and deterrence goals.
4 The normative arguments raised in debates about the wisdom of criminalisation 
of antitrust offenses are examined in W. P. J. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in 
European Antitrust Enforcement 155–201 (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008). Ce
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4.  US experience has much to say about what it takes 
to perform these tasks effectively.5 American antitrust 
history teaches a crucial lesson: Nothing about building 
effective criminal antitrust enforcement is quick or 
easy. Success requires years (more precisely, decades) of 
arduous, sustained effort.
5. This is hardly surprising. Criminal sanctions raise the 
stakes in any body of law. As one leading scholar has 
observed, criminalisation and similar major adjustments 
in a legal system do not “occur in a vacuum.”6 Social and 
political acceptance for robust criminal antitrust enforce-
ment varies according to each country’s legal framework 
and culture. It is unlikely to emerge automatically on the 
day a criminal statute becomes law. Existing norms that 
disfavour criminalisation of antitrust offenses may not be 
immutable, but careful analysis of existing conditions is 
essential to see what must be done to gain acceptance for 
criminal punishment.7
Institutional mechanisms for applying 
criminal sanctions likely will be difficult 
to create
6.  Even when a social consensus supports criminalisa-
tion, the institutional mechanisms for applying criminal 
sanctions likely will be difficult to create. For example, 
the US system vests criminal enforcement responsibility 
in an executive ministry (DOJ), which has competence 
to gather evidence and prosecute offenses. By contrast, 
criminal antitrust enforcement in civil law systems often 
requires cooperation between a civil administrative body 
(the competition agency) and executive branch prose-
cutors. Effective collaboration between public institu-
tions with shared duties seldom emerges smoothly and 
spontaneously. 
7.  To set these and other vital foundations in place 
requires careful deliberation in the law drafting process 
and skilful management in the development of an 
enforcement program. The difficulty of these challenges 
has important implications for how a jurisdiction should 
go about adopting criminal sanctions and for the expec-
tations it should bring to this element of law reform. 
8.  This article uses US experience to identify major 
implementation issues for criminal antitrust enforcement 
and suggest how other jurisdictions might resolve them. 
5 On the history of US experience with criminal enforcement, see D. I. Baker, 
The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and 
Bid-Rigging, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 693; S. Hammond 
and A. O’Brien, The Evolution of Cartel Enforcement Over the Last Two 
Decades: The US Perspective, in M. Krasnodebski-Tomkiel (ed.) Changes 
in Competition Policy Over the Last Two Decades 11 (Polish Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection, 2010); D. C. Klawiter, After the 
Deluge: The Powerful Effect of Substantial Criminal Fines, Imprisonment, 
and Other Penalties in the Age of International Cartel Enforcement, (2001) 69 
George Washington Law Review 745.
6 A. P. Reindl, How Strong Is the Case for Criminal Sanctions in Cartel Cases?, 
in Cseres, Schinkel and Vogelaar, n. 3, 110, 120.
7 On the United Kingdom policy deliberations leading to legislation in 2002 
to criminalise some antitrust offenses, see M. Furse and S. Nash, The Cartel 
Offence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
Comparative and historical perspectives—especially 
awareness of how systems have evolved—provide rich 
insights for institutional design. Perhaps most important, 
the history of the US system indicates that the establish-
ment of an effective criminal enforcement program for 
competition law likely will be a slow, incremental growth.
9. The article begins by discussing how criminal enforce-
ment affects the key elements of a competition law 
system. The article then applies the concept of norms to 
the implementation of a criminal enforcement program. 
The final section uses US experience to suggest how an 
enforcement program can gain acceptance for a norm that 
treats certain conduct as worthy of criminal punishment.
II. Criminal 
enforcement 
and institutional 
interdependencies
10. To assess how criminalisation affects competition law, 
it is useful to view the choice of remedies as one feature 
of a system of interdependent elements. A change in 
one element can alter the operation and importance of 
other elements in ways that either accentuate or mute the 
impact of the first adjustment. In competition law, “equi-
libration” responds to perceived imperfections in one 
aspect of a legal framework by adjusting other system 
elements.8 For example, a court that is concerned that the 
remedies mandated by law are excessive when compared 
to the harm caused by certain violations may bolster the 
liability standard to reduce the number of instances in 
which an infringement of the law will be found to exist. 
11. A system of competition law has six interdependent 
elements: the substantive scope of the legal command, 
the volume and quality of evidence required to prove 
an infringement, the means for detecting violations, the 
prosecution of violations, the adjudication process that 
determines guilt or innocence, and the sanctions imposed 
for infringements. Each is significant to criminal enforce-
ment of competition law.
1. Substantive scope 
of the legal command
12. Competition laws differ in their coverage, but most 
address horizontal and vertical agreements, dominant 
firm conduct, and mergers. These behaviours vary 
significantly according to their perceived competitive 
dangers. Competition law specialists agree that cartels 
8 S. Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of 
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, (1986) 74 Georgetown Law 
Journal 1065. Ce
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ordinarily cause economic harm and rarely benefit 
society.9 By contrast, a dominant firm’s use of exclusive 
dealing is believed to have more ambiguous consequences. 
13. In establishing criminal sanctions, a competition law 
could (a) require the competition agency to challenge all 
conduct through criminal proceedings, (b) give the agency 
discretion to file civil or criminal charges; (c) single out 
specific behaviour as subject to criminal sanctions. In 
the United States, the Sherman Act makes all covered 
conduct subject to criminal prosecution but gives the 
DOJ discretion to bring civil cases, as well. An express 
narrowing of the underlying statutory command to make 
criminal sanctions available only to address demonstra-
bly harmful conduct (i.e., cartels) has the benefit of 
providing more complete assurance that prosecutors will 
not use criminal process to address behaviour with more 
ambiguous competitive effects.
2. Volume and quality of 
evidence required to prove a 
violation
14.  The availability of criminal sanctions affects the 
evidentiary burdens that an enforcement agency must 
bear in two ways. First, criminal offenses ordinarily must 
be established “beyond a reasonable doubt,” whereas 
civil offenses generally must be shown by a balancing of 
probabilities. To challenge conduct as a crime, the prose-
cutor must accumulate and present evidence that is more 
robust than needed for a civil violation.
15. The second effect concerns the tendency in compe-
tition law to form evidentiary presumptions based on 
widely held views about the competitive significance 
of specific conduct. The general method of analysis in 
competition law is a reasonableness assessment which 
weighs positive and adverse economic effects. Conduct 
that always or almost always yields net economic harm 
usually receives a more abbreviated inquiry (“per se” ille-
gality or condemnation by object) that focuses mainly 
on whether the parties entered a forbidden category of 
agreement. 
16. The adoption of a per se prohibition seeks to mark 
the zone of illegality clearly. US antitrust law instructs 
business managers that the bell of illegality rings at the 
moment a firm agrees with a rival to set prices, regard-
less of actual effects. The bright-line rule weakens a firm’s 
capacity to claim that application of criminal process 
involved unfair surprise. Rule of reason offenses, which 
often involve deeper inquiry into motive and effect, 
generally are seen as unsuitable for criminal prosecution.
9 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Cartels: 
Sanctions Against Individuals, (2007) 9 Journal of Competition Law & Policy 
7, 36–46 (reviewing modern enforcement trends).
17. A competition law that treats all offenses as crimes 
and allows no possibility for civil prosecution can create 
crippling rigidities. The prosecutor not only must prove 
all infringements beyond a reasonable doubt, but also 
bears the often difficult burden of convincing a jury of 
laypersons that the conduct at issue (e.g., a merger) is 
grave enough to deserve criminal sanctions. For decades, 
this rigidity robbed Canada’s competition system of 
effective enforcement. In the United States, as discussed 
below, the application of powerful criminal sanctions 
became routine and effective only after DOJ adopted a 
policy to apply the criminal process only to cartels. 
3. Detection of violations
18. By raising the hazards of misconduct, criminal sanc-
tions induce firms to act covertly and take stronger 
precautions to avoid generating evidence that establishes 
a violation. In US experience, the strengthening of the 
enforcement framework (e.g., by adopting more powerful 
sanctions) tends to inspire business counterstrategies that 
seek to conceal collusion.10 
19. As modern evidence with criminal anti-cartel enforce-
ment shows, enforcement agencies and cartel participants 
employ, respectively, ever more powerful enforcement 
techniques and defensive measures.11 Enforcement of the 
Sherman Act drove illicit collaborations underground 
and reduced the amount of direct evidence readily avail-
able to prosecutors.12 Early judicial decisions estab-
lished that a jury could rely on circumstantial evidence 
to infer an illegal price-fixing agreement,13 yet such proof 
provides a less confident basis for a jury to find concerted 
action beyond a reasonable doubt.
20.  Recent experience has featured numerous efforts 
to improve access to direct evidence and to enhance 
the evidentiary basis for prosecuting cartels as crimes. 
The Justice Department’s leniency reforms of the 1990s 
provided strong incentives for firms and individuals to 
reveal the existence of unlawful arrangements.14 Today 
leniency provides the chief  evidentiary means by which 
DOJ prosecutes cartels. US experience underscores how 
criminal sanctions may require adoption of high-pow-
ered information gathering techniques to detect covert 
schemes and prosecute them successfully.
10 See K. J. Cseres et al., Law and Economics of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, 
in Cseres, Schinkel and Vogelaar, n. 3, 1, 11.
11 R. Marshall and L. Marx, The Economics of Collusion (Cambridge: MIT 
Press 2013).
12 See W. E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying 
Informants to Reveal Cartels, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 766, 
785–6 (Sherman Act caused cartel members to take greater precautions to 
avoid detection and successful prosecution).
13 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 234 US 600, 
612 (1914).
14 On DOJ’s leniency program, see A. O’Brien, Leadership of Leniency, in 
C. Beaton-Wells and C. Tran, Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary 
Age: Leniency Religion (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015) 17. Ce
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4. Prosecution
21.  As noted above, the allocation of law enforcement 
authority may complicate the decision to apply criminal 
sanctions. In most jurisdictions, the power to prosecute 
crimes rests exclusively with the executive branch. In the 
United States, an executive department (DOJ) is respon-
sible for criminal antitrust enforcement. DOJ conducts 
the investigation, accepts and considers applications for 
leniency, negotiates plea agreements, files cases, and liti-
gates trials and appeals. One institution (DOJ) formu-
lates criminal enforcement policy and prosecutes all 
criminal cases. 
22.  In most nations, the principal competition author-
ity is an administrative body which lacks authority to 
file criminal cases. To bring criminal antitrust cases, the 
competition authority must enlist the assistance of the 
executive branch prosecutorial body. Harmonious coop-
eration seldom materialises immediately or automati-
cally. Substantial, patient effort on behalf  of top leader-
ship and case handlers in both institutions is necessary to 
make the team effective.
23.  One vital frontier of cooperation involves leniency. 
Leniency facilitates detection only if  prosecutors make 
credible commitments to reduce punishment in return for 
information. Firms are unlikely to reveal misconduct to 
one government body if  disclosure may lead to criminal 
prosecution by another. In a system of shared author-
ity, the competition agency also must persuade the exec-
utive branch prosecutor to devote adequate resources to 
criminal antitrust enforcement. 
5. Adjudication
24.  Successful prosecution of a criminal antitrust case 
requires the government to persuade the judge and a jury 
that the offense warrants criminal sanctions. Judges and 
juries may associate criminal sanctions with offenses such 
as murder or robbery; they may not immediately view 
antitrust offenses as posing serious dangers. Suppose 
judges and jurors think price fixing does not warrant 
the imprisonment of culpable individuals. Judges might 
interpret the antitrust statute in ways that make it harder 
for prosecutors to prevail on criminal antitrust claims. 
Juries simply might engage in “nullification” by refusing 
to find guilt, regardless of the evidence before them. 
25.  To obtain convictions of individuals charged with 
antitrust crimes, the prosecutor must build awareness 
that the challenged behaviour is truly pernicious. Outside 
the courtroom, this education process involves speeches, 
media appearances, and other forms of outreach to 
emphasise the harm of antitrust misconduct. Inside the 
courtroom, the prosecutor must demonstrate the grave 
social hazards of the defendant’s acts. As described 
below, modern US experience underscores the value, in 
building a criminal enforcement program, of selecting 
cases that involve readily apparent harm. 
6. Sanctions
26. The discussion above has highlighted how the percep-
tion of judges and juries about the appropriateness of 
sanctions can affect the interpretation and application 
of legal standards. Moving from lower-powered to high-
er-powered sanctions generates pressures for courts to 
take steps to ensure that higher-powered sanctions are 
visited upon genuinely harmful conduct. Courts may 
insist that the forbidden acts be well defined (to give clear 
notice of what conduct will trigger severe punishment) 
and pose serious dangers to society. Jurors in criminal 
antitrust cases may want stronger assurances that the 
conduct warrants the imprisonment of individuals. 
The decision to challenge conduct 
as a crime or a civil offense is entrusted 
to DOJ’s discretion
27.  In the United States, concerns about the scope of 
criminal enforcement have led to a significant narrowing 
of conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The Sherman 
Act provides no criteria to guide the choice between 
criminal and civil proceedings. The decision to challenge 
conduct as a crime or a civil offense is entrusted to DOJ’s 
discretion. From 1890 until the early 1970s, DOJ gener-
ally focused criminal enforcement on cartels, yet some 
prosecutions in this period challenged non-cartel offenses 
as crimes. In the early 1960s, the DOJ brought criminal 
charges against firms (and individuals) accused of illegal 
monopolisation.15 
28. The 1970s marked an important turn in US enforce-
ment policy. In 1974, Congress raised the Sherman Act 
criminal offense from a misdemeanour to a felony. DOJ 
subsequently narrowed the behaviour subject to criminal 
sanctions. Since 1974, with the exception of a single 
resale price maintenance case,16 DOJ has applied criminal 
enforcement to cartel behaviour only.17 The increase from 
1974 onward in the severity of criminal sanctions created 
a policy imperative to ensure that only grievous miscon-
duct receives criminal sanctions. To do otherwise could 
raise questions about the fairness of US antitrust enforce-
ment and create doubts about its political legitimacy. 
15 In 1963, DOJ obtained an indictment for illegal monopolisation against 
United Fruit and several of its executives for oversupplying Los Angeles 
with bananas. United States v. United Fruit Co., [1961–1970 Transfer Binder] 
Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) ¶ 45,063 (CD Cal, filed July 16, 1963).
16 United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc, 1981 WL 2062 (D Conn 1981).
17 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations 297 
(Apr. 2007) (“The DOJ has made quite clear that it does not currently 
prosecute anything other than hard-core cartel activity criminally, and it has 
no plans to change that policy in the future.”). Ce
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III. Norms and 
criminal antitrust 
enforcement 
29.  “Norms” are consensus views about how members 
of a group ought to behave.18 By contrast to formal legal 
commands, norms are customs or standards that members 
of a group develop voluntarily and apply to themselves. 
Antitrust systems operate within a statutory framework, 
but formal mandates usually give enforcement agencies 
discretion to decide how to implement the formal rules. 
In many jurisdictions, enforcement agencies play a central 
role in determining how the commands will be applied. 
Formal legal rules define the outer boundaries of the 
agencies’ operations, but the agencies often develop 
norms that shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
30.  When a competition agency adjusts enforcement 
norms, it must account for the preferences and likely 
reactions of various external audiences. As mentioned 
above, successful implementation of a criminal enforce-
ment program requires enforcement officials to persuade 
courts that certain antitrust offenses deserve criminal 
sanctions. In criminal antitrust enforcement, DOJ has 
engaged in a continuing interaction with the courts 
with the aim of demonstrating the sensibility of its law 
enforcement program. After the statutory reforms of 
1974, DOJ carefully chose matters whose suitability for 
criminal prosecution would be most evident to a judge or 
a jury. DOJ also used speeches and issued guidelines to 
clarify for business officials and their advisors its criminal 
enforcement intentions. 
31.  Whatever the exact process of change, antitrust 
enforcement norms are certain to change over time. 
This flows from the inherently evolutionary character of 
competition policy.19 The policy evolution that success-
fully introduces criminal sanctions is likely to be incre-
mental and cumulative. Dramatic adjustments some-
times take place, but they ordinarily are not followed by 
dramatic changes that entirely or largely restore the status 
quo ante. New ideas or theories can modify, sometimes 
dramatically, an existing intellectual framework, but the 
“new” idea often has antecedents in earlier thinking. 
The intellectual status quo at any moment usually reflects 
a synthesis of older and newer thinking rather than a 
wholesale displacement of earlier perspectives. 
32.  Competition policy has a substantial experimen-
tal quality. Officials identify the “right” mix of cases 
over time by testing different theories and enforcement 
18 R. D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model 
of Decentralized Law, (1994) 14 International Review of Law & Economics 
215, 218. The discussion of norms and criminal enforcement here builds upon 
the treatment in W. E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of US Competition 
Policy Enforcement Norms, (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 377.
19 State Oil Co v. Khan, 522 US 3, 20 (1997) (in antitrust, Supreme Court has 
distinctive role “in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and 
the lessons of accumulated experience”).
methods. Experimentation sometimes involves bringing 
cases or applying remedies of a sort not previously pros-
ecuted; in other instances, the experiment entails with-
holding prosecution for a matter that might have been 
challenged in the past. Routine evaluations of past 
enforcement measures provide an essential ingredient for 
deciding which policies to pursue in the future. 
IV. The Development 
of modern US 
antitrust criminal 
enforcement norms
33.  Since the Sherman Act’s earliest days, the prose-
cution of cartels has supplied the core of federal anti-
trust enforcement. Modern US experience indicates that 
building a successful criminal antitrust program is a 
long, cumulative process in which agencies test and refine 
enforcement techniques. 
34.  The Justice Department’s prosecution of criminal 
antitrust violations advanced through several phases in 
the second half  of the 20th century and into the begin-
ning of the 21st century. A pivotal development in the 
late 1950s and early1960s was the successful prosecu-
tion of cases against producers of turbine generators 
and other equipment used to produce and transmit elec-
tricity.20 The electrical equipment cases yielded prison 
terms for a number of company executives. Although 
the sentences served (a few weeks) pale in comparison to 
incarceration periods that later became routine, the pros-
ecutions helped build business and public awareness that 
horizontal price fixing grossly violated competition law 
and warranted incarceration.
35. The second key steps took place in the 1970s. In 1974, 
Congress elevated the Sherman Act criminal offense 
from misdemeanour to felony; increased the maximum 
prison sentence for individuals from one year to three; 
and boosted the maximum fine from $50,000 to $100,000 
for individuals and from $50,000 to $1 million for corpo-
rations.21 In 1955, Congress raised the amount to $50,000 
from the original Sherman Act amount of $5,000. 
36.  The evolution of US antitrust fines from 1890 to 
1974 underscores an important point about the criminal 
punishments. The prospect of any criminal punish-
ment likely chastened business managers whose careers 
would end or decline by the mere fact of sentencing. 
Yet the deterrent impact on the business entity may be 
20 On DOJ’s prosecution of the electrical equipment conspiracies, see 
J. G. Fuller, The Gentleman Conspirators: The Story of the Price-Fixers in 
the Electrical Industry (Grove Press 1962).
21 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 
(1974) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 USC). Ce
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weak unless the fines are formidable. By the early 1970s, 
a maximum fine of $50,000 was a laughably small sum. 
In the mid- to late 1970s, DOJ urged courts to apply the 
enhanced penalties vigorously and pressed to make the 
imprisonment of culpable individuals routine.22 
37. The 1980s featured further enhancements to criminal 
sanctions for antitrust offenses. In this decade the Reagan 
administration pressed for increases in statutory sanc-
tions and sentencing policy reforms that would increase 
the average prison term served by individuals guilty of 
antitrust offenses. In 1984 Congress created a new mech-
anism for calculating criminal fines that permits the 
maximum Sherman Act fine for corporations and indi-
viduals to be set at twice the loss suffered by victims or 
twice the gain realised by the offender.23 The double-
the-loss, double-the-gain mechanism would supply the 
basis for the eight- and nine-figure recoveries in the food 
additives, graphite electrodes, vitamins, and art auction 
cartel cases in the 1990s.24 In 1987 new federal sentenc-
ing guidelines took effect and increased the likelihood 
that individuals convicted of Sherman Act offenses will 
serve longer prison terms.25 In 1990, Congress raised the 
maximum Sherman Act fine for individuals to $350,000 
from $100,000 and for corporations to $10 million from 
$1 million.26 
38.  Enforcement since 1970 increased in parallel with 
enhancements in sanctions. In the 1970s, the Anti-
trust Division expanded efforts to prosecute collusion 
criminally. DOJ in the 1980s and early 1990s further 
augmented criminal enforcement. From 1981 through 
1988, DOJ initiated more criminal prosecutions than the 
total of government criminal antitrust cases from 1890 
to 1980; the Department continued to emphasise impris-
onment for individual offenders.27 In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s DOJ pioneered the use of criminal actions to 
prosecute invitations to collude.28
39. By the end of the George H. W. Bush Administra-
tion in 1992, the legislative and policy adjustments of the 
previous two decades had accomplished several impor-
tant ends. The augmented sanctions increased the like-
lihood of imprisonment for guilty individuals and 
boosted DOJ’s ability to seek large fines from companies. 
The aggressive prosecution of cartel schemes served to 
22 See Baker, supra n. 5, 705 (describing evolution of US criminal enforcement 
scheme).
23 18 USC §§ 3571(d) (1994). Congress first enacted this provision in the 
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat 3143, 
and reenacted the measure in the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-185, 100 Stat 1279.
24 See Klawiter, supra note 5 (discussing double the loss, double the gain fine).
25 The sentencing guidelines for antitrust offenses appear at USSG § 2R1.1 
(2005).
26 Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588 (1990), 104 
Stat 2880 (codified at 15 USC §§ 1, 2).
27 See Baker, supra n 5, 695–96, 705–07.
28 See United States v. Ames Sintering Co, 927 F2d 232, 236 (6th Cir 1990) 
(per curiam) (upholding convictions for wire fraud and attempted wire 
fraud resulting from defendant’s attempt to arrange bid-rigging scheme by 
telephone).
establish the social and political legitimacy and regular-
ity of severe criminal sanctions for cartels. By the early 
1990s, the fact of routine prosecution and severe punish-
ment had become accepted elements of the nation’s 
competition policy.
40.  DOJ criminal enforcement through the early 1990s 
focused heavily on public procurements to construct or 
improve major infrastructure assets. The emphasis on 
public procurement played an important part in helping 
to build broad social and political acceptance for the idea 
that cartels should be condemned strictly and that indi-
viduals engaged in misconduct should be imprisoned. 
One way to socialise acceptance of strict criminal penal-
ties for collusion is to target activities that society regards 
as contemptible. Theft from the public treasury through 
bid rigging is such an offense. 
41.  The 1990s brought important innovations in cartel 
detection. Since the early 1980s, federal enforcement offi-
cials had increased their ability to obtain direct evidence 
of collusion. The Antitrust Division resorted more 
extensively to wire-tapping and electronic surveillance 
and broadened cooperation with other law enforcement 
entities and government bureaus.29 In 1993 and 1994 
DOJ expanded leniency to increase incentives for cartel 
participants to inform.30 Better detection and enhanced 
sanctions spurred major enforcement breakthroughs in 
the 1990s.31 From 1995 through 2000 DOJ collected more 
fines for antitrust crimes than it obtained from 1890 to 
1994. From the vitamins cartel alone, DOJ obtained 
hundreds of millions of dollars in criminal fines32 and 
gained prison terms for individual offenders, including 
foreign nationals.33 
42. In the 2000s, the US criminal enforcement program 
obtained additional upgrades. In 2004 Congress adopted 
the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement and Reform 
Act, which increased the maximum prison sentence for 
individuals to ten years; lifted the maximum fine for indi-
viduals to $1  million; raised the Sherman Act fine for 
corporations to $100 million; and reduced the exposure 
of certain leniency applicants in private treble damage 
follow-on suits.34 
29 See J. Whalley, Priorities and Practices—The Antitrust Division’s Criminal 
Enforcement Program, (1988) 57 Antitrust Law Journal 569, 571-2 
(describing expanded use of wiretaps and other surveillance techniques to 
gather evidence of illegal collusion).
30 US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Corporate Leniency Policy 
(10 August 1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) § 13,113; 
US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Individual Leniency Policy 
(10 August 1994), reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) § 13,114.
31 See G. R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants 
for Reporting Violations, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 798 
(describing criminal enforcement accomplishments of 1990s).
32 Hoffman La Roche and BASF paid criminal fines of $500 million and 
$225 million, respectively, to resolve DOJ’s claims.
33 See H. First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecution and the Coming of 
International Competition Law, (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 711, 716-18 
(describing guilty pleas by foreign nationals in Vitamins case).
34 Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215(a), 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004). Ce
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43.  The progressive enhancement and increasingly 
successful implementation of DOJ’s criminal enforce-
ment program from the late 1950s to the present has 
built upon a commonly held belief  about the competi-
tion policy role of criminal prosecutions. After the 1974 
legislative reforms, DOJ’s leadership made criminal pros-
ecution DOJ’s highest competition policy priority. Each 
decade’s accomplishments—ascending levels of cases 
prosecuted, fines collected, individuals imprisoned, and 
average length of sentences served—rested upon the 
contributions of previous decades. In each period DOJ 
rolled out new enforcement approaches, tested the policy 
“prototypes,” assessed the results, expanded the use of 
successful techniques, and pursued necessary modifica-
tions in Congress or by means committed to the Depart-
ment’s discretion.35 A commitment to continued improve-
ment underpinned this process.
V. Conclusion: 
Institutional 
implications
44. The impact of a system of legal commands depends 
vitally on the institutions created to execute them.36 Close 
study of US experience illuminates the special institu-
tional demands of a criminal enforcement regime and 
identifies how a jurisdiction might best implement a 
system of criminal sanctions.
1. Transparency
45.  Through the meaningful disclosure of processes, 
policies, and decisions, competition agencies promote 
clarity, increase understanding, and discipline their 
exercise of discretion by subjecting their actions to 
external review and criticism. Transparency guides 
business operators about the content of and ration-
ale for specific decisions and helps ensure the regular-
ity and honesty of public administration. This quality is 
especially significant for criminal enforcement. Because 
criminal sanctions are the most powerful means by which 
a society can enforce its laws, a government agency must 
take additional measures to ensure that their application 
is sensible.
35 See, e.g., 60 Minutes with Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, 
Antitrust Division, (1986) 55 Antitrust Law Journal 255, 260 (discussing 
Reagan Administration’s support for sentencing reforms that would increase 
prison terms served by individuals guilty of price fixing).
36 See J.-J. Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development, in 
B. Pleskovic and J. E. Stiglitz (eds.), Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics 1998 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999) 
237 (discussing institutional foundations for successful competition policy 
systems).
46.  Recognising how enforcement norms develop and 
change over time underscores the importance of trans-
parency devices. Policies that commit the agency to 
reveal information about how it exercises the decision to 
prosecute help inform the competition policy commu-
nity about the content of enforcement norms within the 
agency and permit discussion about whether existing 
norms are worthy of adjustment. Extensive public discus-
sion before the enactment of a criminal enforcement 
regime and revelation of the agency’s enforcement inten-
tions during the process of implementation serve to build 
needed acceptance for criminal sanctions and to establish 
their political legitimacy.
2. Institution building
47. Antitrust agencies arrive at a given policy equilibrium 
by periodically expanding and contracting the zone of 
enforcement. Testing the validity of different hypothe-
ses involves making enforcement decisions that calculate 
risks about intervening too aggressively or not interven-
ing enough. Without experiments that sometimes inter-
vene too much or sometimes intervene too little, enforce-
ment authorities could not determine the correct mix 
of policies. As noted below, the experimental quality of 
competition policy demands that the agency periodically 
assess the effects of chosen policies.
48.  US experience shows that the success of criminal 
enforcement programs depends upon the willingness 
of leadership to make long-term investments to build 
administrative capacity and to enhance the agency’s 
reputation. This requires fidelity to a norm that empha-
sises long-term institutional improvement and discour-
ages the inclination to focus chiefly on measures that 
generate immediately appropriable results for incum-
bent leadership.37 US experience underscores how the 
construction of the US criminal antitrust program was a 
slow growth, and its success has hinged upon investments 
made in each decade in each key element of the enforce-
ment program.
49. Among the most important means to achieve policy 
improvements is to embrace a norm favouring ex post 
assessment of outcomes.38 A habit of evaluation can 
perform the broader function of placing individual 
policy initiatives in a larger historical context. By seeing 
how policy actually evolves, agencies can better under-
stand what they must do to improve performance. 
37 See H. Heclo, The Spirit of Public Administration, (2002) 35 PS: Political 
Science & Politics 689, 691 (“Nothing closes so many doors on real 
opportunity as opportunism. A person who is forever weighing the odds of 
immediate success can never believe in anything long enough to make it 
succeed.”); W. E. Kovacic and D. A. Hyman, Consume or Invest? What Do/
Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, University of Washington Law Review 
(Forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705919.
38 On the importance of ex post assessment as an element of competition policy, 
see W. E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance 
of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 503 
(2006). Ce
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50. The tasks of system design and evaluation for criminal 
enforcement can benefit considerably from comparative 
study. Each jurisdiction considering or implementing a 
criminal enforcement program can benefit from the expe-
rience of other jurisdictions that already have set out on a 
policy path. Comparative study and international coop-
eration may not provide perfect answers to each challenge 
that a jurisdiction faces in considering criminalisation of 
antitrust law, but they can provide an accurate predic-
tion of the institutional challenges that criminalisation 
entails. To know these challenges in advance creates the 
best possible opportunity to prepare for and surmount 
them. For criminal enforcement, careful study of the US 
experience is an indispensable part of this comparative 
inquiry. n
Is there public support 
for cartel criminalisation?
Andreas Stephan
a.stephan@uea.ac.uk
Professor of Competition Law, Centre for Competition Policy and UEA Law School, University of East Anglia, Norwich
I. Introduction
1.  This article draws on the findings of four surveys 
carried out in 2014 to answer the question of whether 
there is public support for cartel criminalisation.1 Follow-
ing the proliferation of substantive competition laws 
and then leniency programs, one of the most distinctive 
trends in global antitrust over the past decade has been 
the increasing number of jurisdictions that can impose 
criminal sanctions on individuals and/or firms respon-
sible for cartel conduct. These typically exist along-
side civil enforcement regimes and are reserved for the 
most serious horizontal restrictions. The countries with 
criminal cartel laws number around 25-30 (depending 
on how one defines a criminal cartel offence), but this 
does not include jurisdictions that apply criminal sanc-
tions only to bid rigging (sometimes restricted to public 
procurement). While the increasing number of criminal 
cartel offences poses a number of challenges for compe-
tition lawyers advising multinational firms, the level of 
actual enforcement outside the United States is still very 
low, with only a handful of individuals ever having served 
custodial sentences in other jurisdictions.2
1 For a summary of the full results, see: A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes 
to Price Fixing in the UK, Germany, Italy and the USA, CCP Working Paper 
15-8.
2 See A. Stephan, Four Key Challenges to the Successful Criminalization of 
Cartel Laws (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2(2) pp. 333–362.
2. The trend towards criminalisation is likely to continue, 
but diverging approaches to enforcement are already 
emerging. Perhaps the most obvious of these is within 
the European Union, where around 11 of the EU’s 28 
Member States have criminal cartel laws, while a number 
of others have explicitly rejected them. Reasons for 
rejecting cartel criminalisation range from fears about 
undermining leniency programs to objections from 
the business community.3 Moreover, there have been 
no moves to criminalise cartel laws on the European 
Community level. Administrative fines and criminal 
antitrust enforcement actually serve the same function. 
Indeed, for the purposes of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the Strasbourg Court has made clear that 
administrative antitrust fines are of a “criminal nature” 
and must comply with fundamental rights.4 At their core, 
both enforcement approaches impose a punitive sanction 
and seek to achieve some level of deterrence so as to 
protect individual consumers and the wider economy 
from serious anticompetitive harm. 
3 See, for example: Practical Law, Swedish Competition Authority Opposes 
Proposal to Criminalise Cartels (31 May 2005); A. Stephan, New Zealand 
Rejects Cartel Criminalization for the Wrong Reasons (9 December 2015) 
Competition Policy Blog; and Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority, 
Report on the Criminalisation of Cartels was Presented to Stakeholders 
(28 May 2014), available: http://www.kkv.fi/en/current-issues/press-
releases/2014/report-on-the-criminalisation-of-cartels-was-presented-to-
stakeholders (accessed 25 Jan 2016).
4 See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy (2011) App No. 43509/08. See, 
generally: A. Scordamaglia-Tousis, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling 
Effective Public Enforcement with Fundamental Rights (Kluwer 2013). Ce
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II. Framing the 
criminalisation 
debate 
3.  Criminalisation is being driven largely by deterrence 
theory, which tends to assume that cartelists weigh the 
expected benefits and costs of collusion and decide 
whether to engage in the activity accordingly.5 Viewing 
cartel conduct from this perspective, there is a growing 
realisation that administrative sanctions alone (which 
are usually some form of financial penalty) may not be 
enough to discourage the most damaging forms of cartel 
conduct.6 Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses 
treat administrative fines as a cost of doing business and 
empirically we know that antitrust fines may not exceed 
the illegal profits earned by cartel members.7 As any indi-
vidual monetary sanctions can be indemnified as part of 
cartel arrangements, a purely administrative enforcement 
regime does not adequately reach the individual decision 
makers responsible for cartel conduct. Indeed, the length 
of time between cartel formation and the imposition of 
administrative fines is such that those responsible for the 
conduct may very well have retired or moved to another 
firm.8 It is thought that only the threat of imprisonment 
serves to deter those individuals. Its power is clear from 
the enforcement success of the US Department of Justice 
and the fact that, anecdotally at least, some international 
conspiracies appear to be avoiding the United States.9
4. However, using the criminal law in antitrust is contro-
versial. Many view it as an extreme form of regulatory 
control and argue that it is wrong to use the criminal law 
to prevent a largely “morally neutral” activity. Tradition-
ally, criminal offences are reserved for the most serious 
and objectionable acts in society. The trend towards 
“over-criminalisation” risks eroding the power and signif-
icance of the criminal law, ultimately weakening the deter-
rent effect of all criminal offences. Specifically, the tradi-
tionalists’ objection to a criminal antitrust offence is that 
it is not clearly underpinned by the prevention of social 
harm and by morality.10 Morality is perhaps of particu-
lar significance because cartel laws generally punish the 
entering into of a cartel agreement, not its harmful effects. 
5 G. Becker, (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of 
Political Economy, 76, 169.
6 See Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), A World Class Competition 
Regime (London: The Stationery Office, 2001), Cm.5233, §§ 7.13-7.18.
7 E. Combe and C. Monnier, Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: 
The Myth of Over Enforcement (2009) Cahiers de Recherche PRISM-
Sorbonne Working Paper; C. Craycraft, Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s 
Ability to Pay (1997) Review of Industrial Organization 12, 17.
8 A. Stephan, The Direct Settlement of EC Cartel Cases (July 2009) ICLQ 58(3) 
pp. 627–654.
9 D. I. Baker, Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model? 
in C. Beaton-Wells and A. Ezrachi (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical 
Studies of an International Regulatory Movement, (Oxford: Hart, 2011).
10 See, for example: J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in Gray (ed.), On Liberty and Other 
Essays (Oxford: OUP 1991), and Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 
(Oxford: OUP 1965).
Indeed antitrust laws are rarely concerned with whether a 
hard-core cartel arrangement actually achieved any harm 
or was even successfully implemented. If the person on 
the street cannot easily identify the harm or describe what 
is objectionable about the act of price fixing, say, then one 
might argue it is appropriate that antitrust be regulated by 
civil, not criminal law. 
The difficulties associated with building 
a prosecution around dishonesty
5.  Some point to the UK’s experience of cartel crim-
inalisation as proof of this. The original cartel offence 
introduced by the Enterprise Act  2002 only applied to 
individuals who acted “dishonestly.” It was hoped the 
offence would “send out a strong message to the perpe-
trators, their colleagues in business, the general public and 
the courts.”11 This suggested there were some doubts as 
to whether each of those constituent groups understood 
why cartels were objectionable. This appears to have been 
confirmed by the difficulties associated with building a 
prosecution around dishonesty. The first criminal cartel 
trial to be contested before a jury only came in 2015 and 
resulted in two defendants being acquitted based solely 
on the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, 
casting doubt on the existence of dishonesty.12 Some 
point to the many difficulties associated with the dishon-
esty test, arguing that the case simply vindicated the UK 
Government’s decision to drop the dishonesty require-
ment in 2014 and replace it with a series of carve outs and 
defences where there is no secrecy.13 Yet others believe 
that an attempt to use the criminal law to increase deter-
rence and the moral opprobrium of an activity that is 
not already widely regarded as being immoral is wrong.14 
Williams notes, “this amounts to a kind of legal alchemy 
which ultimately will not work, and instead risks damaging 
the moral credibility of the criminal law more generally.”15 
There is something unsatisfactory about 
describing price fixing as theft or fraud
6. Most responses to this criticism seek to draw parallels 
between cartel conduct and either fraud or theft. This is 
evident in the language used by competition authority offi-
cials, even in jurisdictions where the only sanctions avail-
able are in fact administrative. The most famous expres-
sion of this parallel with traditional property offences 
probably comes from Klein, who spoke of price fixing as 
11 Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Hansard HC Deb 
vol. 383 col 48 (10 April 2002).
12 R v. Dean and Stringer (2015) Southwark Crown Court, unreported. See also 
Competition and Markets Authority, CMA statement following completion of 
criminal cartel prosecution (24 June 2015).
13 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s. 47.
14 A. Jones and R. Williams, The UK Response to the Global Effort Against 
Cartels: Is Criminalization Really the Solution? (2014) Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement 2(1) pp. 100–125.
15 R. Williams, Cartels in the Criminal Law Landscape, in C. Beaton Wells and 
A. Ezrachi (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International 
Regulatory Movement, (Oxford: Hart 2011), p. 312. Ce
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being “nothing more than theft by well-dressed thieves.”16 
Yet there is something unsatisfactory about describing 
price fixing as theft or fraud. It does not usually involve 
violence or result in a critical mass of harm that can be 
easily identified. Crucially it is questionable whether the 
level of deception in cartel conduct is strong enough to 
amount to a fraud. This is perhaps more straightforward 
in the context of bid rigging because bidders deliberately 
submit false bids in manipulation of what is clearly a 
process that invites competitive bids. It explains why bid 
rigging is treated more harshly than other forms of cartel 
conduct in some jurisdictions. 
7. In the context of price fixing, output restriction and 
market sharing, demonstrating a positive deception 
becomes a little more difficult. First there is the fact anti-
trust laws make no effort to estimate the actual harm 
caused by a cartel, despite the fact the strongest justifica-
tion for criminalising cartel conduct lies in the enormous 
amount of economic harm caused by such arrangements. 
The second problem is that without fairly sophisticated 
analysis, it is not easy to identify the harm, as this would 
require some estimation of the counterfactual. Where, 
for example, three firms form a cartel out of crisis and 
the alternative would have been one of the three firms 
going bust and leaving a duopoly, prices may not have 
been very different absent the cartel. The final problem 
is that the deception—giving the appearance of compe-
tition when in fact there is none—requires that consum-
ers expect markets to be competitive and that prices are 
calculated by firms independently of each other. Ward-
haugh goes further, asserting that in a liberal society that 
relies largely on the free market economy, cartels strike 
at an important institution, hindering individuals’ ability 
to secure their own well-being.17 One might consider, for 
example, the fact that some consumers will be priced 
out of the market and denied access to certain products, 
because cartels tend to reduce output and raise prices to 
levels beyond the reach of poorer buyers, in pursuit of 
higher profit. As Whelan notes in his excellent analysis of 
the criminalisation question, there are actually a number 
of theoretical, legal and practical aspects to cartel crimi-
nalisation and these must be considered together in order 
to give a meaningful and comprehensive evaluation.18 
16 J. Klein, The Antitrust Division’s International Anti-Cartel Enforcement 
Program, Speech at the American Bar Association Spring Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., April 6, 2000.
17 B. Wardhaugh, Cartels, Markets and Crime: A Normative Justification for the 
Criminalisation of Economic Collusion (Cambridge: CUP 2014).
18 P. Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: 
Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges (Oxford: OUP 2014).
III. Studying public 
perceptions and 
criminalisation
8.  It is therefore with some caution that this paper 
now turns to the issue of consumers’ expectations and 
perceptions. These are important to the criminalisa-
tion question in a number of respects. First, if  consum-
ers expect markets to be competitive and for separate 
undertakings to set their prices independently of each 
other, this lends support to any arguments for criminal-
isation centred on deception. While cartels may be able 
to function without the need to make a positive decep-
tion of the kind we would expect in a traditional fraud 
(e.g. making statements to customers that are completely 
untrue), they tend to be highly clandestine. Cartels 
almost universally go to great lengths to hide the arrange-
ment—in particular by operating outside the institutions 
of the firm and communicating covertly. However, there 
is a whole host of commercially sensitive information 
that firms withhold from consumers. The argument that 
a clandestine cartel amounts to a deception only holds if  
consumers expect competition to be the norm. Second, 
they help us understand the extent to which members 
of the public consider cartel practices to be objection-
able and deserving of punishment. This alone may not be 
justification for imposing criminal sanctions, but it does 
help us understand whether they are viewed as purely 
regulatory matters. Views of whether cartels should 
be punished also help us understand whether ordinary 
consumers (many of whom may serve procurement func-
tions of various kinds in their professions) recognise the 
harmful effects of cartels without the need to demon-
strate a quantifiable overcharge. This would lend some 
support to a social harm basis for cartel criminalisation.
9. The survey projects used to assist us in exploring the 
abovementioned issues were carried out online between 
27  June and 15  July 2014, by YouGov Plc in the UK, 
Germany and the US, and in cooperation with Research 
Now in Italy. The sample was selected from online panels 
and drawn to be representative of the general popula-
tion in each country according to a list of demographic 
characteristics. The sample sizes were: 2,509 (UK); 2,648 
(Germany); 2,521 (Italy); and 2,913 (USA). The study 
was a follow-up of a 2007 survey carried out only in the 
UK19 and asked a variety of questions relating to price 
fixing. Questions generally gave respondents two alterna-
tive options and were asked to indicate which they agreed 
with more.20
19 A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel 
Enforcement (2007) CCP Working Paper 07–12.
20 Full question wording available in the working paper: Stephan 2015 (n. 1). Ce
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1. Do consumers expect 
independent pricing decisions?
10. One of the most significant findings of the surveys 
was that around two thirds of respondents in the UK, 
Germany and Italy expected “each business they buy from 
to have set their prices independently of each other” and 
objected to “firms talking with each other about the prices 
they charge.” The proportion in the US was just over half. 
Less than one in three felt it was normal for competing 
businesses to talk to each other about prices, and that 
proportion was only one in five in the UK. These findings 
suggest consumers are far from indifferent to the way 
firms calculate their prices. It also suggests that where 
competing firms depart from the competitive process 
and cease calculating prices independently of each 
other, most consumers will continue to assume prices are 
competitive unless they are told otherwise by the firms. 
Attempts, therefore to hide or suppress the disclosure of 
information about the existence of a cartel, may amount 
to a significant deception. 
11.  Throughout the survey results it is surprising how 
uniform attitudes to price fixing were between the 
European countries and how they were comparatively 
weak in the United States. Indeed this was despite some 
significant differences in attitudes to the role of govern-
ment and the free market. Almost two thirds of Ameri-
cans believed “that a free market economy, in which govern-
ment control is kept to a minimum, is the best economic 
system for creating wealth and prosperity.” By contrast 
almost half  of Italians believed “that wealth and prosper-
ity can be better achieved through greater government inter-
vention in the economy.” This would suggest that expec-
tations about independent pricing are not closely linked 
to perceptions of the free market in the way some may 
expect. Perhaps the expectation of independent pricing 
is more to do with values of fairness than faith in the 
benefits of the competitive free market process.
2. Is the act of price fixing 
considered objectionable?
12. In all four jurisdictions a strong majority of respond-
ents (79% GB; 78% DE; 73% IT; 66% US) recognised price 
fixing as a harmful practice that was deserving of punish-
ment. It is notable that in all jurisdictions other than Italy 
those unsure were greater in number than those who felt 
price fixing was a harmless practice that should be left 
unpunished. The survey questions were silent on how 
price fixing was treated in law by each of the four jurisdic-
tions. Indeed, despite such a high proportion of respond-
ents recognising cartel conduct as a harmful conduct that 
deserved punishment, there was a significant amount of 
uncertainty as to whether price fixing was actually illegal. 
Only 53% of Britons and Italians thought price fixing 
was illegal and, surprisingly, only 41% of Americans. 
The proportion in Germany was significantly higher 
(75%), but this may have been due to a number of high 
profile cartel cases that occurred in Germany over the 
six-month period immediately preceding the fieldwork 
and the Bundeskartellamt’s efforts in recent years to 
target infringements involving consumer products. When 
asked to explain why they felt price fixing was a harmful 
practice deserving of punishment, respondents strongly 
related to statements indicating price fixing was harmful, 
unethical, immoral and dishonest. There was even over-
whelming support in all four jurisdictions for price fixing 
to be treated as a “crime.” Unfortunately this question 
proved of limited use as it was unclear whether respond-
ents had understood the difference between a crime and 
other forms of illegality. Nevertheless, it would therefore 
appear that, despite obvious confusion about how cartels 
are actually treated in law, a strong majority of respond-
ents in each of the four jurisdictions recognised price 
fixing as objectionable and harmful enough to deserve 
punishment. 
13.  In order to determine how objectionable consum-
ers felt price fixing was, the surveys turned to questions 
about sanctions and comparisons with more traditional 
forms of wrongdoing. These revealed some limitations 
to popular perceptions. While there was strong support 
for public naming and shaming, the imposition of corpo-
rate fines exceeding the illegal profits, and a personal 
fine for individuals responsible, support for imprison-
ment of those individuals was comparatively weak (27% 
UK; 28% Germany; 26% IT; 36% US). It is important to 
note that the question asked specifically about imprison-
ment and this implied incarceration. Therefore the level 
of support for criminal enforcement (for example where 
first offenders get a suspended sentence) may be higher. 
While a majority of respondents in the UK, Germany 
and the US felt price fixing was of equivalent severity 
to fraud, at least 40% in all four jurisdictions felt fraud 
and theft was more serious. Opinions were also divided 
about how price fixing compared to other forms of finan-
cial crime. Respondents generally felt price fixing was 
comparable to tax evasion (50% UK; 41% DE; 35% IT; 
44% US) and insider trading (56% UK; 49% DE; 41% IT; 
47% US), but many felt even these practices were more 
serious (Tax evasion: 45% UK; 52% DE; 59% IT; 48% 
US. Insider trading: 29% UK; 31% DE; 43% IT; 39% 
US). Price fixing compared far less favourably against 
misleading consumers about the safety of goods (more 
serious than price fixing: 64% UK; 59% DE; 75% IT; 63% 
US) and driving while under the influence of drink or 
drugs (more serious than price fixing: 76% UK; 69% DE; 
84% IT; 69% US). Out of the range of other misbehav-
iour put to respondents, a strong majority only agreed 
that price fixing was more serious than a person illegally 
downloading music. These are likely to reflect the remote 
nature of the harm caused by cartel conduct and suggest 
that respondents do not fully appreciate the magnitude 
or extent of the economic harm cartels are capable of 
achieving. 
14.  Despite these limitations, it is worth noting that 
support for imprisonment in the UK was only 11% in the 
2007 study (amounting to a threefold increase in support) 
and the proportion of people who felt price fixing was 
dishonest also appears to have increased significantly. 
The weak results from the US suggest any hardening 
in attitudes may have little to do with rigorous antitrust Ce
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enforcement, as one would expect the American respond-
ents to be far more willing to condemn price fixing. It may 
instead reflect increased awareness and anger towards 
corporate wrongdoing following the financial crisis and 
well-publicised cases such as Libor manipulation. Any 
such effects of the financial crisis and their extent are 
hard to estimate and need further research. Finally, it 
could simply be due to poor information dissemination 
and coverage of antitrust issues in the popular media.
IV. Concluding 
remarks
15. The findings of the survey study suggest that consum-
ers do expect competing businesses to calculate prices 
independently of each other. They also suggest a clear 
sentiment that cartel practices are objectionable because 
they result in harmful price increases and are deserving 
of punishment. These appear to satisfy the morality and 
social harm prerequisites to criminalisation, especially as 
the clandestine nature of cartel arrangements appears to 
strengthen arguments that they amount to a deception. 
Yet there are clear limitations to this. While cartels may 
not be “morally neutral” in quite the way some critics 
of criminalisation suggest, especially as around half  of 
respondents across the board feel it is as serious as fraud, 
some struggle to equate it to other types of wrongdoing, 
some of which are arguably significantly less harmful 
than price fixing. The weak support for imprisonment is 
also problematic because the custodial sentence is key to 
the deterrence objective of cartel criminalisation. Propo-
nents of criminalisation will find it difficult to depart 
from calls for custodial sentences for as long as there are 
no viable administrative sanctions against individuals 
that cannot be indemnified by the cartel.
16. Neither side of the criminalisation debate is likely to 
have been converted by the analysis in this paper. Public 
perceptions are another instructive element which help us 
further develop the discourse on cartel criminalisation—
especially in relation to normative arguments, criticisms 
and justifications. They should not be taken as definitive 
indicators of whether criminalisation is justified or viable 
in practical terms. The US has enjoyed significant success 
in cartel criminalisation, yet the survey results suggest it 
is far from a special case when it comes to public percep-
tions. Practical and institutional aspects of criminalisa-
tion may be of equal importance. n
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